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DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN LEGAL 
EDUCATION AND LEGAL PRACTICE:  
A DIALOGUE BETWEEN PROFESSORS  
AND PRACTITIONERS* 
PANELISTS** 
KRISTIN BEBELAAR is an Associate with Gulielmetti & 
Gesmer, P.C., where she practices family law, real estate law, 
and general civil litigation. Prior to law school, she was the 
Children’s Program Coordinator at La Casa de las Madres, a San 
Francisco shelter for battered women, and she later worked in a 
special project of the San Francisco District Attorney’s Office to 
improve child sexual abuse investigations. She graduated from 
Brooklyn Law School in 1996. After law school, she worked as a 
staff attorney at the HIV Project of South Brooklyn Legal 
Services, where she represented low-income, HIV-positive 
clients in family, housing, health, discrimination and estate law 
matters. 
 
STACY CAPLOW is Professor of Law at Brooklyn Law School 
and the Director of the Law School’s Clinical Education 
Program. Since 1976, she has taught diverse clinics at Brooklyn 
                                                          
 * This article is a transcription of a program held at Brooklyn Law 
School on April 15, 2002. The event was sponsored and coordinated by 
Brooklyn Law Students Against Domestic Violence (BLSADV), a feminist 
student organization at Brooklyn Law School, to address the importance of 
incorporating gender issues, including domestic violence, into law school 
curriculum. 
 ** Professor Chantal Thomas, Professor of Law at Fordham University 
School of Law, participated in this program; her remarks are not reproduced 
in this article. 
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Law School, including a criminal defense clinic, an inmate 
counseling clinic, a prosecutors clinic, and several externships. A 
former staff attorney with the Legal Aid Society, she currently 
teaches the Safe Harbor Clinic. She has taught Criminal Law and 
Criminal Procedure II for many years, as well as seminars and 
classes in White Collar Crime and Federal Criminal Law. During 
the 1980s, she was the Chief of the Criminal Court Bureau of the 
Brooklyn District Attorney’s Office, as well as their Director of 
Training. She has also served as a Special Assistant U.S. 
Attorney in the Civil Division of the Eastern District of New 
York. She recently taught the Prosecution Clinic at New York 
University School of Law as an Adjunct Professor and is active 
in various organizations relating to clinical legal education. Her 
scholarship interests range from gender issues to portrayals of 
women lawyers in popular culture. 
 
PATRICIA FERSCH is the founder of the Family Law Center 
in New York City. Law is her second career. She was previously 
a retail buyer, merchandise manager and a wholesaler/ 
manufacturer in costume jewelry in the retail trade. She returned 
to school for her undergraduate degree in 1983 for the purpose of 
finding a new career that would enable her to help people. Her 
new career goals were solidified in December 1990 after she saw 
a 60 Minutes piece called Grandmothers at Law. She interned 
with the organization in the summer of 1991 and decided to start 
a similar practice in New York. She volunteered at the Legal Aid 
Society when she started the Family Law Center as a low-fee 
legal office serving the working poor in the five boroughs. She is 
committed to serving individuals who are in need of legal 
services but are unable to pay conventional attorneys’ fees. 
Because of the importance of her internship experience, she 
works with summer interns every year and has recently expanded 
her practice by hiring one of her former interns as an associate. 
 
BETTY LEVINSON is a Partner at Levinson & Kaplan, and her 
primary practice areas are litigation and family law. She 
graduated from Brooklyn Law School in 1973 and was admitted 
to the Bar of the State of New York in April 1974. After two 
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years as a criminal defense attorney at the Legal Aid Society in 
New York County, she began working exclusively in private 
practice. In addition to teaching and lecturing on gender, family 
law, lesbian and gay, and domestic violence issues, she has been 
counsel in a number of novel cases. In 1975, she was counsel for 
amici in Bruno v. Codd, a successful challenge of the 
mistreatment of battered women by the Family Court, Police 
Department, and the Probation Department. In 1985, she 
represented the defendant in People v. Green, described in her 
article, Using Expert Testimony in the Grand Jury to Avoid a 
Homicide Indictment for a Battered Women: Practical 
Considerations for Defense Counsel, Women’s Rights Reporter 
(Fall 1986). In 1992, she was co-counsel in Matter of Evan, New 
York’s first lesbian adoption case. She also served as counsel for 
the plaintiff in Nussbaum v. Steinberg, obtaining a ruling which 
for the first time tolled New York’s one-year statute of 
limitations for a civil assault action brought by a battered woman. 
 
JENNIFER L. ROSATO is Professor of Law at Brooklyn Law 
School. Her area of interest focuses on ethical and legal issues 
related to healthcare decisions made on behalf of children. Recent 
articles on this subject have appeared in the Journal of Law, 
Medicine and Ethics, Temple Law Review, and op-ed articles in 
several newspapers across the country. She also writes in the area 
of gender and the law and other family law. She frequently 
lectures on family law issues and is active in a variety of bar 
committees and organizations devoted to these issues. She served 
as a Law Clerk to Judge Thomas O’Neill, Jr. of the U.S. District 
Court of the Eastern Pennsylvania and was an Associate with the 
firm of Hangley, Connolly, Epstein, Chicco, Foxman & Ewing. 
After teaching at Villanova University School of Law, she joined 
the Brooklyn Law School faculty in 1992. 
 
ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER is the Rose L. Hoffer Professor 
of Law and Chair of the Edward V. Sparer Public Interest Law 
Fellowship Program at Brooklyn Law School. She is author of 
the prize-winning book Battered Women and Feminist 
Lawmaking (Yale University Press 2000) and co-author of the 
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law school casebook Battered Women and the Law (Foundation 
Press 2001) with Clare Dalton, Professor at Northeastern 
University Law School. A national expert on gender and law, she 
has written numerous articles on civil rights, women’s rights and 
civil procedure, and has lectured around the world on these 
issues. She has also been a Visiting Professor at Harvard and 
Columbia Law Schools. In June 2000, she was recognized by the 
National Organization of Women–NYC with a “Women of 
Power and Influence” Award. She has been active in legal 
education reform, serving as a member of Association of 
American Law Schools (AALS) Executive Committee and on the 
Board of Governors of the Society of American Law Teachers 
(SALT). She joined the faculty of Brooklyn Law School in 1983, 
after clerking for Judge Constance Baker Motley of the United 
States District Court for the Southern District of New York, 
serving as a staff attorney with the Center for Constitutional 
Rights and a staff attorney with the Rutgers Law School–Newark 
Constitutional Litigation Clinic. 
 
ANTHONY J. SEBOK is Professor of Law at Brooklyn Law 
School, specializing in tort law and tort theory. He has authored 
articles concerning handgun litigation, punitive damages, and the 
differences between European and American tort systems, and 
has lectured widely on American tort law. He has also published 
Legal Positivism in American Jurisprudence (Cambridge 
University Press 1999) and numerous law review articles on 
jurisprudence, as well as co-edited the Philosophy of Law: A 
Collection of Essays (Garland Publishing 1994). He was awarded 
a Berlin Prize Fellowship by the American Academy of Berlin in 
1999, enabling him to spend a semester abroad as a Visiting 
Scholar at Humboldt University, where he began work on a 
series of articles examining tort theory and punitive damages. He 
returned to Berlin in 2001 as the DAAD Visiting Professor at the 
Freie Universitat. Professor Sebok is also a regular columnist at 
FindlLaw. He received his Ph.D. in politics and was Law Clerk 
to Chief Judge Edward N. Cahn of the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania before joining the 
faculty of Brooklyn Law School in 1992. His current research 
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interests concern the way in which tort law is used to resolve and 
remedy social problems. 
 
LISA C. SMITH is Assistant Professor of Clinical Law at 
Brooklyn Law School and is an expert in the area of domestic 
violence. She served for many years as Executive Assistant 
District Attorney for Domestic Violence, Sex Crimes and Child 
Abuse in the King’s County District Attorney’s Office. She is a 
member of the New York State Governor’s Advisory Council on 
Domestic Violence and the Chairperson of the Brooklyn 
Domestic Violence Fatality Review Team. She has initiated 
several innovative programs to combat domestic violence that 
have garnered national attention, lectures frequently on domestic 
violence issues, and is often quoted in the media on this subject. 
She has directed the Prosecutors Clinic at Brooklyn Law School 
for more than a decade and recently broadened the clinic’s scope 
to include federal misdemeanors in the Eastern District of New 
York. Before joining the faculty at Brooklyn Law School in 
1987, she served in the King’s County District Attorney’s Office 
in the Narcotics Bureau, the Sex Crimes Bureau and as Deputy 
Chief of the Criminal Court Bureau. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Good afternoon. My name is Candace Sady and I’m one of 
the coordinators of this event from Brooklyn Law Students 
Against Domestic Violence (BLSADV), a feminist student 
organization here at Brooklyn Law School.1 We planned this 
symposium to address the importance of incorporating gender 
issues, including the issue of domestic violence, into the law 
school curriculum. 
The origin of this idea was a discussion during my Spring 
2001 Battered Women and the Law class with Professor 
Elizabeth Schneider. We were talking about domestic violence 
through the lenses of sociology and psychology. A member of the 
class said that law school should teach students to be lawyers, not 
social workers or psychologists. She proceeded to say that she 
had come to law school to become the former. 
Basically, this comment made me think about the manner in 
which a person who would not pre-select to learn about the issue 
of domestic violence might respond when confronted with it in 
practice. It made me consider how an attorney’s lack of 
understanding or interest in a client’s needs, experiences or 
background might affect that attorney’s perceptions, and how that 
could negatively impact their legal practice. 
Too often students graduate from law school without an 
understanding of how domestic violence impacts the lives and 
legal claims of their clients—without a clear understanding of the 
link between theory and practice. This panel, consisting of law 
professors who teach criminal law, torts, family law and 
contracts, each paired with a practitioner practicing in that area, 
will address this omission. 
                                                          
1 Candace Sady is a graduate of Brooklyn Law School, 2002, Oberlin 
College, 1996, and is currently an Associate in the litigation and dispute 
resolution department at Proskauer Rose LLP. She would like to thank 
Professor Elizabeth Schneider for her assistance in organizing the symposium, 
Jennifer L. Cohen-Vigder for her endless contributions to the event and the 
Executive Board and all members of Brooklyn Law Students Against Domestic 
Violence. 
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I’d like to thank everyone in the audience for attending, and 
the panelists for taking the time to prepare for this discussion. At 
this time I’d like to introduce the moderator, Professor Elizabeth 
Schneider. 
DISCUSSION 
Professor Elizabeth Schneider 
First, I want to say how wonderful it is to have a panel like 
this that was organized by the students in BLSADV. Thanks to 
all of you and special thanks to Candace, who took tremendous 
initiative in putting this program together. This is what you 
dream about as a teacher, that issues come to the fore in your 
classes and that students in those classes are so engaged that they 
take the initiative to educate the legal community more broadly. 
Today, we have an impressive group of speakers, both 
colleagues on the Brooklyn Law School faculty and other law 
schools, and a great group of practitioners. Our topic is legal 
education and domestic violence—the need for integration of 
issues of domestic violence more broadly into the law school 
curriculum. Our focus is on criminal law, torts, contracts, and 
family law. 
This subject of domestic violence and legal education is very 
close to my heart. I’ve been working for many years now with a 
group of law teachers around the country on these issues and 
with the American Bar Association Commission on Domestic 
Violence. The ABA Commission has published important reports 
on legal education and domestic violence and organized a series 
of conferences around the country on legal education and 
domestic violence.2 We now have specialized courses—what I 
                                                          
2 DEBORAH GOELMAN & ROBERTA VALENTE, A.B.A. COMM. ON 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, WHEN WILL THEY EVER LEARN? EDUCATING TO END 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A LAW SCHOOL REPORT (1997) (describing the need to 
integrate domestic violence issues into law school curricula in order to train 
lawyers to better handle domestic violence issues), available at 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/publications/infores/etedv/welcome.html (last 
visited Apr. 3, 2003); A.B.A. COMM. ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, TEACH YOUR 
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call “stand-alone courses”—courses on Battered Women and the 
Law, that I teach here at Brooklyn Law School, and that I’ve 
taught at Harvard, Columbia, and Florida State University Law 
Schools. These specialized courses are taught at many law 
schools around the country.3 But there are also law teachers 
around the country who are integrating issues of domestic 
violence into their mainstream law school courses. And of course 
there are also specialized advocacy programs on domestic 
violence, clinics on domestic violence, and other upper-level 
courses that integrate these issues. 
Almost every course in law school could and should integrate 
these issues—first-year courses, clinics, specialized courses like 
health law, family law, or poverty law, international human 
rights, and employment law. If you look at the casebook on 
domestic violence that Clare Dalton and I have written, you’ll get 
a sense of the range of different issues and courses which are 
affected.4 
We have a critical responsibility here in the law school to 
train lawyers. As many of you probably know, there are far too 
few lawyers to assist battered women on the many issues for 
which they need representation.5 Even lawyers who practice in 
                                                          
STUDENTS WELL: INCORPORATING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE INTO THE LAW 
SCHOOL CURRICULUM: A LAW SCHOOL REPORT (forthcoming 2003). 
3 For a comprehensive review, see generally A.B.A. COMM. ON 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, TEACH YOUR STUDENTS WELL, supra note 2 
(examining efforts by law schools nationwide to incorporate domestic violence 
into law school curricula). 
4 CLARE DALTON & ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND 
THE LAW (Foundation Press 2001) [hereinafter DALTON & SCHNEIDER] 
(examining domestic violence in relation to family law, criminal law, civil 
protection orders, tort liability, civil rights, employment law, insurance law, 
immigration and asylum law, and international human rights). 
5 See id. at 339-49, 1062-92 (discussing legal representation in domestic 
violence cases). See also Justice Suarez, Decision of Interest, N.Y. L.J. (Feb. 
11, 2003) at 18 (emphasizing that inadequate compensation has produced an 
insufficient number of panel attorneys resulting in the denial of counsel to 
family court litigants, and the courts are forced to proceed, on a regular basis, 
without attorneys in domestic violence, foster care placement and review, 
child protective and juvenile delinquency proceedings). 
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the field of family law do not have knowledge or experience with 
intimate violence so that they can even recognize when they have 
a case that involves these issues.6 Issues involving domestic 
violence can arise in almost every area of practice. So we have a 
tremendous obligation to educate ourselves and younger lawyers 
about issues of domestic violence. 
I want to give special thanks both to my colleagues on the 
faculty of Brooklyn Law School who will be speaking today: 
Stacy Caplow, Lisa Smith, Tony Sebok, Jennifer Rosato, and to 
others who are not speaking, who have been terrifically 
supportive and enthusiastic about this curricular work. And I 
want to thank other colleagues, such as Chantal Thomas from 
Fordham Law School7 and Betty Levinson from Levinson & 
Kaplan, who are participating in this program. 
It is also particularly special to have Kristin Bebelaar with us 
today. Kristin, now a lawyer in practice with Gulielmetti & 
Gesmer, who previously worked at South Brooklyn Legal 
Services, is a Brooklyn alum who worked closely with me as a 
research and teaching assistant when I was beginning to teach 
Battered Women and the Law and write these books. I know that 
as a lawyer she is now making a huge difference in the lives of 
many battered women. She’s an example to me of the enormous 
impact that learning about domestic violence as a law student can 
make to legal practice. 
We will now begin the program. 
We start with criminal law, with Stacy Caplow, who teaches 
criminal law here as the professor. Lisa Smith, although she is 
both professor and practitioner in the Prosecutor’s Clinic here, 
will be speaking from the practitioner perspective. Then, we will 
go to torts with Tony Sebok, who teaches torts here, as the 
professor and with Betty Levinson from the practitioner’s 
perspective. Then, we will move to contracts with Chantal 
Thomas talking from the contracts professor’s perspective, and 
Kristin Bebelaar from the contracts practitioner’s perspective. 
                                                          
6 DALTON & SCHNEIDER, supra note 4, at 806-79 (examining domestic 
violence and the law of torts). 
7 The remarks of Professor Chantal Thomas are not reproduced in this 
publication. 
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And then finally family law, with Jennifer Rosato who teaches 
family law here, speaking from the perspective of the professor, 
and Pat Fersch from the perspective of the practitioner. We’ll 
then open it up to all of you for questions, comments and 
discussion. 
 
Professor Stacy Caplow 
I enter this conversation with a disclaimer: I do not hold 
myself out to be a model for teaching or incorporating domestic 
violence into first-year criminal law classes. To say otherwise 
would be false advertising in front of the many people present 
today who were students in that class. On the other hand, I make 
a determined effort to deal with these issues as a distinct part of 
the curriculum. I probably represent a fairly typical example of 
the difficulties that arise when people with good intentions try to 
integrate this subject into a basic first-year course. In addition, 
having taught criminal law for many years, I also appreciate how 
the topic of domestic violence has metamorphosed over this time 
period with this course and how it has seeped into other classes.8 
Criminal law seems like an obvious place to begin this 
discussion. It is the course where issues of domestic or intimate 
violence recur in so many of the cases read, even without 
                                                          
8 Other commentators have made similar observations. See, e.g., Martha 
Albertson Fineman, Domestic Violence, Custody, and Visitation, 36 FAM. 
L.Q. 211, 215 (2002) (explaining that domestic violence is no longer 
considered strictly a criminal law concern). The treatment of domestic abuse 
in areas like tort law changed dramatically in the past decade. Id. In addition, 
because of feminists and women’s rights advocates, laws were changed and 
policies and programs developed to address the dilemmas of women often 
referred to as battered. Id. This evolution is also present in practice, outside of 
the academic realm. See, e.g., M. Mercedes Fort, A New Tort: Domestic 
Violence Gets the Status It Deserves In Jewitt v. Jewitt, 21 S. ILL. U. L.J. 
355, 372 (1997) (explaining that a major change in domestic violence laws is 
the ability of plaintiffs to recover for damages from an abusive relationship 
under the theory of a new tort of domestic violence/battered women’s 
syndrome); Nancy J. Knauer, Same-Sex Domestic Violence: Claiming a 
Domestic Sphere While Risking Negative Stereotypes, 8 TEMP. POL. & CIV. 
RTS. L. REV. 325, 341-43 (1999) (describing the extension of domestic 
violence protection to same-sex couples). 
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necessarily being labeled as such. You do not need a casebook 
that is called “Domestic Violence and the Law” to read about 
forcible rape, abuse and neglect of children, or to encounter 
cases involving battered women raising justification defenses, or 
to study cases involving provocation or extreme emotional 
disturbance defenses in which male defendants essentially claim 
“she drove me crazy so I killed her.” These are a few of the 
innumerable topics in criminal law where sex and violence are 
linked. 
Before I begin my brief remarks, I want to acknowledge 
someone in the audience who was one of the first people to bring 
to light the lack of coverage of domestic violence and other 
gendered topics in the criminal law course particularly. Nancy 
Erickson, who now works for Legal Services of New York here 
in Brooklyn, taught family law for many years at Ohio State and 
at New York Law School, and as a law teacher really was the 
first person to ask the questions, “What are we teaching about 
domestic violence?” and “What are we teaching about sex bias in 
criminal law?” Nancy published two articles in 1990 examining 
sex bias issues in criminal law courses and did a survey of 
criminal law professors concerning what they teach about these 
issues.9 
There has always been an obvious relationship between 
intimate and family violence and criminal law, so it should be 
inevitable that these topics pervade that course.10 Yet more than 
ten years ago Nancy looked at the standard criminal law 
casebooks, and found them seriously lacking in any kind of in-
depth coverage of these topics; some were even devoid of any 
                                                          
9 Nancy S. Erickson (with the assistance of Nadine Taub), Final Report: 
“Sex Bias in the Teaching of Criminal Law”, 42 RUTGERS L. REV. 309 (1990) 
[hereinafter Erickson, Final Report]; Nancy S. Erickson & Mary Ann 
Lamanna, Sex-Bias Topics in the Criminal Law Course, A Survey of Criminal 
Law Professors, 24 MICH. J. L. REFORM 189 (1990) [hereinafter Erickson & 
Lamanna, Sex-Bias]. 
10 See, e.g., Franklin E. Zimring, Legal Perspectives on Family Violence, 
75 CAL. L. REV. 521 (1987) (discussing the intersection between privacy law, 
in both civil and criminal contexts, and family violence). 
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coverage.11 She also reported the paucity of attention paid by 
faculty to these topics.12 
Taking a leaf from her work and thinking that this was a good 
way to begin my remarks, I re-read her articles and then looked 
at the most recent editions of six casebooks in my office, one of 
which I now use,13 and two others which are familiar to me.14 
The remainder were books I had never examined closely 
before.15 
Progress over the past decade has been mixed. These newer 
editions contain more topics, expand familiar topics, and 
generally give at least lip service to the notion that domestic and 
intimate violence issues present complicated questions that 
deserve a distinct place in the study of criminal law. With the 
exception of the clearly recognizable issues of battered woman’s 
syndrome and rape, most texts often include cases involving 
domestic and intimate violence simply to illustrate broader 
doctrines without acknowledging the underlying concerns that 
                                                          
11 Erickson, Final Report, supra note 9, at 316-17, 327-28 (noting that 
despite growing interests regarding topics that concern women such as marital 
violence and property distribution, “traditional casebooks has been evidenced 
by the failure to include, or by superficial coverage, of [such] topics . . . in 
the criminal law course”). 
12 Id. at 223, 242-43. The study revealed that the topics least likely to be 
covered in a criminal law class were the common law doctrine of coverture, 
spousal-conspiracy doctrine, and issues of sexual harassment. Id. at 223. Some 
of the many reasons cited by professors for not teaching these topics were the 
belief that the doctrines were no longer relevant, lack of casebook coverage, 
the thought that such topics were more relevant to other courses, and the 
perceived unimportance of the subject matter compared to others in criminal 
law. Id. at 213, 223-24. 
13 JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW (2d ed. 
1999). 
14 JOHN KAPLAN ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (4th ed. 
2000); SANFORD KADISH ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES (7th ed. 
2001). 
15 RICHARD J. BONNIE ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW (1997); GEORGE E. DIX & 
M. MICHAEL SHARLOT, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (5th ed. 
2002); STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW: CASES & MATERIALS 
(1994). 
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prompt the crime.16 
Several basic topics are included in all of the books, with 
varying degrees of thoroughness. Some books have expanded 
their coverage noticeably since their earlier editions. Predictably, 
in every book there are materials about the battered woman’s 
syndrome defense that address issues that are far more 
complicated and treat developments over the past decade with a 
fair amount of depth.17 This is not surprising since this particular 
topic has been one of the leading gendered issues in criminal 
law—along with rape—for a long time.18 Equally unsurprising, in 
                                                          
16 Cf. BONNIE, supra note 15, at 792 (citing People v. Casassa, 49 
N.Y.2d 668 (1980)). Casassa involved a man who killed the woman with 
whom he was in love simply because she did not love him in return; it is 
included in the section discussing when provocation can be used to reduce 
murder charges to manslaughter. Id. See also KADISH, supra note 15 at 197 
(citing Kuniz v. Montana, 995 P.2d 951 (Mont. 2000)). In Kuniz, the 
defendant stabbed her live-in boyfriend with a knife after he became physically 
abusive towards her. Id. Kadish includes the case in the section discussing 
what constitutes culpable conduct and, specifically, whether the defendant had 
a duty to seek medical assistance for the victim in light of the fact that she 
caused the situation. 
17 Cf. DRESSLER, supra note 13, at 486-506; KAPLAN ET AL., supra note 
14, at 581-610, 763-75; BONNIE ET AL., supra note 15, at 360-74; DIX ET AL., 
supra note 15, at 786-801; SALTZBURG ET AL., supra note 15, at 751-67. 
Almost all of the books feature the same two cases: State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 
364 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1984) (noting that whether expert testimony on battered 
woman’s syndrome is admissible evidence depends on whether it is relevant to 
the defendant’s claim of self-defense; however, the use of force in self-defense 
is only justifiable when “the actor reasonably believes that such force is 
immediately necessary to protect himself against death or serious bodily 
harm,” therefore, the expert must testify carefully so as not to determine 
whether the defendant’s fears and actions were reasonable since that is a 
question only the jury is permitted to answer) and State v. Norman, 378 
S.E.2d 8 (N.C. 1989) (disagreeing with the idea that evidence of battered 
woman’s syndrome is sufficient, without more, to justify killing as perfect self 
defense, and therefore, the defendant, who was continuously abused by her 
husband, was not entitled to a charge of perfect self defense since her husband 
was sleeping when she shot him and there was no justifiable fear of imminent 
bodily harm). The differences appear in the discussion in the notes following 
the lead case. 
18 Cf. Albert R. Roberts, The Criminal Justice System Can Reduce 
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every casebook there is an extensive chapter on rape and sexual 
violence offenses, all of which have expanded demonstrably over 
the past decade.19 
Rape and battered woman syndrome are obvious subjects that 
could trigger class discussion about the underlying social and 
psychological issues of domestic violence as well as enforcement 
policies. Probably most criminal law teachers engage in some 
form of historical or sociological conversations in their courses. 
However, there are other less obvious topics which should not be 
ignored but are often sacrificed in the name of doctrinal analysis. 
For example, in every book, there are some cases relating to the 
reasonableness standard in either or both the self-defense and 
provocation sections in which gender differences arise.20 Often 
the cases in these sections are factually based on violence against 
women, wives, girlfriends or objects of male fantasy. Some, but 
certainly not all, of the casebooks have attempted to go beyond 
the usual questions related to the heat of passion doctrine such as 
“Are mere words sufficient?” and have added note material about 
the reasonableness standards based on gender.21 Domestic and/or 
                                                          
Violence Against Women, in VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 163 (James D. Torr 
ed., Greenhaven Press 1999) (explaining that in the last two decades all fifty 
states have passed criminal statutes to protect battered women and that 
prosecution of spousal abuse as well as rape cases has steadily increased); 
KADISH ET AL., supra note 14, at 313 (noting that few areas of criminal law 
have attracted as much controversy and attention as rape over the past two 
decades); STANLEY G. FRENCH ET AL., VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: 
PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES 57 (1998) (discussing that a woman is more 
likely to be battered than raped and acknowledging long standing debate of 
battered woman’s syndrome as an imperfect defense) [hereinafter VIOLENCE 
AGAINST WOMEN]. 
19 DRESSLER, supra note 13, at 353-434; KAPLAN ET AL., supra note 14, 
at 313-86, 1077-160; BONNIE ET AL., supra note 15, at 268-322; DIX ET AL., 
supra note 15, at 571-613; SALTZBURG ET AL., supra note 15, at 381-458. 
20 Cf. BONNIE ET AL., supra note 15, at 354 (noting that the 
reasonableness standard is an objective standard, thus, “jurors must decide 
whether the defendant’s beliefs would be held by a reasonable person in the 
defendant’s ‘situation.’”). 
21 Cf. DRESSLER, supra note 13, at 238-63; KAPLAN ET AL., supra note 
14, at 385-415 (including several key cases involving violence by man against 
woman); KADISH ET AL., supra note 14, at 405-25 (highlighting cases 
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intimate violence is at the heart of the facts of most of these 
cases, but they are studied to illustrate traditional doctrinal 
issues, and follow-up notes rarely raise more complicated 
questions of gender or sex-bias. Other examples of a category of 
cases that offer opportunities to consider domestic and intimate 
violence are those dealing with omissions in the criminal act—or 
actus reus—section, or relating to the standard of negligence in 
unintentional killings, or causation. In almost all of these cases, 
the death of a child results in a caregiver or parent being charged 
with some form of either negligent homicide or assault for either 
directly harming, or failing to prevent harm to the child.22 Yet, 
aside from their very disturbing facts describing violence towards 
children, these cases are rarely used to spark any discussion 
beyond straightforward doctrinal analysis. 
I did note some new topics in the more recently published 
texts. A few books acknowledged the so-called “cultural 
defenses,” which often pose sex-linked issues about how men and 
women behave under certain circumstances when they import 
cultural norms and behavior to the United States and then find 
themselves criminally accountable.23 Sometimes, but not always, 
the charges involve what Americans would consider domestic or 
                                                          
involving killing by jealous male partner); BONNIE ET AL., supra note 15, at 
776-801 (illustrating Model Penal Code approach, citing People v. Casassa, 
404 N.E.2d 1310 (N.Y. 1980) (involving a rejected suitor)); DIX ET AL., 
supra note 14, at 473-94 (including a case where the defendant and victim 
were “romantically involved”); SALTZBURG ET AL., supra note 14, at 284-304 
(including a case involving the killing of a “paramour”). 
22 DRESSLER, supra note 13, at 277-80 (citing People v. Williams, 484 
P.2d 1167 (Wash. 1971) (convicting parents of manslaughter for failing to 
obtain medical treatment for their child)), 196-200 (citing Oxendine v. State, 
528 A.2d 870 (Del. 1987) (involving brutal child abuse in context of 
causation-in-fact)); KAPLAN ET AL., supra note 14, at 472-75 (citing State v. 
Williams, 484 P.2d 1167 (Wash. Ct. App. 1971) (holding parents liable for 
failing to provide medical attention to baby when a man of reasonable 
prudence would have done so under similar circumstances)). See also KADISH 
ET AL., supra note 14, at 431-33. 
23 See, e.g., DRESSLER, supra note 13, at 419 n.6, 683-94; KAPLAN ET 
AL., supra note 14, at 415-26 (noting the relevance of cultural norms on 
mother’s killing of child), 599 n.11 (noting the various battering and cultural 
defenses). 
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family violence or abuse. 
There are also limited references to extending the battered 
spouse defense to include other victims of violence, notably 
children.24 There was only one book that had a separate section 
on any kind of feminist legal theory.25 Every so often, there 
might be a snippet from something written by some notable and 
recognizable feminist scholars such as Liz Schneider, Susan 
Estrich or Nancy Erickson. However, other than those occasional 
excerpts tucked into the notes in the chapters on rape or the 
battered spouse defense, there is very little overarching theory at 
all. 
Why are casebooks important? As Nancy realized years ago, 
they basically structure what is taught in the course.26 In her 
survey, Nancy asked many criminal law teachers why a certain 
subject was not covered. The most common response was 
“Because it is not in the textbook.”27 Therefore, if something is 
not in the book, chances are teachers will be restricted by those 
editorial—and possibly ideological—choices, unless they have the 
energy and the creativity to supplement the materials. 
Casebooks do not just limit the subjects taught; they flag 
certain perspectives based on which cases are chosen and how 
those particular cases are edited. By the language used, cases 
reveal what the judge is thinking about the particular facts of the 
case. However, to impressionable first-year students, in 
particular, who tend to accept uncritically the perspective 
presented in the case, the cases shape the very way in which the 
issues are internalized. Even the teacher who is willing and 
                                                          
24 See, e.g., DRESSLER, supra note 13, at 505-06 n.5 (discussing the use 
of battered woman syndrome as a defense for the domestic partner who 
participated in a crime spree because she felt compelled to); KADISH ET AL., 
supra note 14, at 775 (stating, “[m]any courts that permit the use of battered 
woman’s syndrome to support a claim of self-defense accept similar evidence 
in cases involving a battered or abused child who kills the abusive parent”); 
BONNIE ET AL., supra note 15, at 374 n.4 (discussing the analogy between the 
battered wife syndrome and the battered child syndrome as defenses for 
murder). 
25 SALTZBURG ET AL., supra note 15, at 90-96. 
26 Erickson & Lamanna, Sex-Bias, supra note 9, at 311. 
27 Id. at app. A. 
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desirous of incorporating more materials faces the limitations 
posed by case selection and editing. It is worth observing, 
however, that case selection particularly in the chapters or 
sections on rape and the battered woman’s syndrome defense 
were practically identical in all of the books I examined. There 
are only a finite number of cases that raise the central issues 
effectively. 
We have been asked to talk about our concerns and 
inhibitions about raising domestic violence topics in a course not 
expressly dedicated to those issues and that purports to examine 
the law “objectively.” Probably anything I could say about this 
would be true for any course with the possible exception of 
Women and the Law. Principally, there is the coverage tension, 
the challenge all of us face in every course to finish the materials. 
Because issues concerning domestic violence are so rich and so 
controversial, emphasis on them may exacerbate the coverage 
dilemma. Students will want to talk about them in class and no 
instructor would want to cut off discussion. Having raised 
provocative questions, it would be unfair to say, “Okay, that was 
our five minutes on that hot topic.” You want to see the 
conversation develop, yet whenever you dedicate a lot of time to 
one issue you detract from others. Therefore, these choices 
present their own controversies given the expectations of the 
students about the course coverage and approach. 
Another characteristic of criminal law that is less true about 
other courses is that the course is loaded with emotional land 
mines throughout the semester. You never know when there is 
somebody in the class for whom a case resonates, who has had a 
personal experience or similar event in their lives, whether 
directly as a crime victim, or whether they identify with either 
the victim or the defendant in some way. These are very touchy 
issues and can be flashpoints during class discussions. I am sure 
all of us teaching criminal law or family law have had students 
come up to us to say, “I’m not participating in this 
discussion . . . I hope you’ll understand.” They will describe 
something that happened to them, or to a relative or friend, that 
makes them uncomfortable about participating, or perhaps even 
attending class. 
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In addition to the land mines, there are also considerable 
gendered reactions to many criminal law issues. The criminal law 
course offers myriad opportunities for very exciting and lively, 
but often uncomfortable, debates about rape and other issues that 
reveal the differences between the women and men in the class 
concerning certain values and conduct. These topics create class 
divisions at the outset, and, for the instructor, it is very hard to 
steer tactfully and diplomatically through the class’s turbulent 
discussion. Moreover, it is difficult to remain objective about 
many of these subjects in front of the room. It is particularly hard 
to refrain from either discrediting or sanctioning certain deeply 
held points of view. Ideology and partisanship always create a 
risk of alienating a portion of the students. Because the semester 
will outlast any single class or discussion, there may be a big 
price to pay for taking sides or even appearing biased. This is 
especially true for a woman professor whom the students 
undoubtedly assume has a “female” perspective on sex crimes 
and gender related issues. 
In my first-year class, the anxiety students already feel about 
speaking out is compounded by the nature of the subject matter. 
Some students are silenced by the sad and violent facts of the 
cases and their emotional content, while others are emboldened to 
speak out about their beliefs even though their comments have a 
tenor that departs from typical classroom atmosphere. Either 
way, they often speak or fail to speak for reasons largely related 
to emotions or feelings. This compounds the stress of the class. 
Not only are students concerned about whether they understand 
the material, they also worry about how they are reacting to it 
emotionally, and how their classmates are reacting to them. 
Moreover, during their first-year adjustment period, they 
generally struggle with the basic question of whether and to what 
degree their personal beliefs, past histories and feelings can and 
should play a role in their legal studies. As they try to learn to 
“think like a lawyer,” they often overcompensate by being too 
objective and neutral. In a criminal law class, this suppression of 
genuine feelings and beliefs contributes to the self-doubt 
experienced by many first-year students during their first 
semester. 
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Whatever divisions result from students’ experiences, their 
politics, or their beliefs, those differences intensify during 
discussions like this, and it is very hard to steer a steady course 
without jeopardizing the good will of some, if not many students, 
both on that day and in the future. In addition, I am not 
convinced—and here I speak from my own experience—that all 
teachers have the same ability to navigate these issues without a 
shipwreck. I certainly do not hold myself out as an expert on 
domestic violence, and I know that I cannot teach these topics as 
skillfully as somebody who knows more than I do. Although I do 
claim a degree of sensitivity and self-awareness that perhaps not 
all criminal law teachers possess, I still do not feel confident 
about my ability to handle these volatile subjects. I have 
convinced myself that sincerity and tact will save the day. 
Perhaps that is wishful thinking.28 
It is hard to be all things to all people. It is especially hard to 
be all things to all students. They microscopically examine 
everything we say, reading meaning into remarks when none is 
intended, and are quick to find fault. As any of us who have read 
student course evaluations know, they are full of inconsistencies: 
either you let them talk too much or you cut them off too soon; 
you let some students dominate and other people feel put upon or 
ignored. All of these difficulties are just exacerbated in the 
context of these provocative topics. 
Usually, criminal law is a required course and students cannot 
                                                          
28 For example, on an anonymous evaluation form, one student recently 
criticized me for being tactless during our discussion of rape because I asked 
the class to tell me about personal experiences before the whole class and 
when no one did, assuming that no one had any experiences, I questioned 
women about how they would react. This comment dramatized for me just 
how tricky these discussions can be since this description is radically different 
from what I believe occurred. I actually have a script that I use in the 
beginning of this section every year which specifically tells the students that 
they do not have to talk about personal experiences, that they have to treat this 
subject and others’ viewpoints with respect, and that they have to appreciate 
that some students may have had personal experiences that inform their 
opinions. Despite this admonition, this student apparently heard something 
completely different from what I said, probably because of his or her own 
expectations and discomfort. 
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pick their professor. Teaching about domestic violence in this 
setting, then, poses the problem that the student is participating in 
something without having chosen it. For some students—of 
course—this emphasis is perfectly acceptable, but for others it 
could be objectionable or—if not objectionable—at least they 
question what this emphasis is costing in the coverage of other 
topics: “Are we missing something if we spend so much time on 
this?” 
I have a few thoughts about how I might try to improve my 
own class. One is to try to unlink domestic violence issues from 
gender identification. If perceived as a woman’s issue, male 
students—many of whom already feel alienated from the topic or 
intimidated about speaking out by the strength of many women’s 
views—will further shut down. Consistent with this, I would 
prefer a more integrationist approach. In other words, instead of 
labeling an issue “domestic violence,” identify how the case is 
really about domestic violence disguised as a more neutral 
doctrinal voice. 
I also think at the same time I would re-link domestic 
violence to more universal issues that come up in criminal law—
link sex and violence more directly to seemingly objective 
doctrines like reasonableness. Many of the texts provide some 
tools for achieving this. Link the causes of domestic violence and 
its emotional roots to issues that we all question in criminal law, 
at least from time to time, about where and how emotion and 
passion matter. The many ways in which men and women engage 
in intimate violence provide vivid and depressing examples of the 
kind of human behavior that the criminal law addresses. By using 
domestic violence as an example rather than a focal point, a more 
successful conversation might ensue. 
Also, I think when we examine court decisions we should 
prod students to consider what is omitted from the text. When, 
instead of just saying “Miss So-and-So is the mother of a seven-
year-old child,” the judge writes, “Miss So-and-So is the mother 
of an illegitimate seven-year-old child”—a fact that has nothing to 
do with the case—we should ask what this signals about the 
resulting outcome. This kind of blatant editorializing within a 
judicial decision is something that we all think about 
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occasionally.29 Why not think about it even more, bring it up in 
other topics in relation to all of the cases we read, and to 
consider how the people and the parties in the cases are being 
portrayed and the assumptions these portrayals produce? 
Another suggestion is to encourage students to create their 
own stories about what is missing from the facts of a case. For 
example, there is a one-paragraph case in the Dressler casebook 
called Martin v. State, in which a man is dragged out of his 
house by the police and charged with public intoxication. 30 The 
question is whether he committed a voluntary act. The class can 
have a nice conversation about voluntariness, and it is a good 
case for using a conventional Socratic technique. But we read it 
in the beginning of the semester, so I often ask my students, 
“What’s going on here? Why were the cops even at the house? 
Was there something else happening besides this man being 
drunk and pulled out of the house?” I ask them to write a more 
detailed statement of facts. Many students come up with a 
domestic violence story, “He was drunk, and was being abusive 
to his wife. A neighbor called the police.” Sometimes you can 
see how domestic violence is the hidden text of many seemingly 
more neutral stories. 
In terms of techniques, if students tell stories, particularly if 
they experiment with role reversal a little more, they may be able 
to see how stereotypes determine our thinking. Even more 
importantly, I think we ought to take a chance on bringing more 
of the world back into the classroom—something I try to do in 
many ways including in the context of domestic violence. Read 
newspaper articles and relate them to cases in the text so that the 
                                                          
29 This is not to suggest that all judges are biased or derisive in domestic 
violence cases, although the potential ought to be noted. Cf. Joan S. Meier, 
Notes from the Underground: Integrating Psychological and Legal 
Perspectives on Domestic Violence in Theory and Practice, 21 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 1295, 1353 (1993) (stating that “judges in family court frequently 
express disrespectful attitudes towards the parties and the cases.”). In fact, the 
situation in the District of Columbia was so severe that an incoming presiding 
judge of the family division of the local courts suggested that training for the 
bench include psychological consultation so judges could separate their 
personal views from their professional duties. Id. at 1353 n.176. 
30 17 So. 2d 427 (Ala. Ct. App. 1947). 
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issues introduced by cases in the book feel more contemporary 
and real. Have guest speakers. Go to court and see what is 
happening in the real world. Nothing in the classroom will 
resemble what is going on in family or criminal court and the 
real stories of the people caught up in these systems. I encourage 
people to do more of that in their regular classrooms. 
All professors are role models in some way. What students 
learn, how they learn it, and what is emphasized in law school 
will follow them into the real world, and factor into the choices 
they make in practice. We have to acknowledge the responsibility 
of shaping the consciousness of our students. To the extent that 
we have a commitment to exposing this particular topic—and take 
care to include it more in our courses—we will leave a legacy. 
 
Professor Lisa Smith 
I’m Professor Lisa Smith, and I teach a variety of the 
criminal clinical programs here at Brooklyn Law School. I’ve 
been asked to speak as a practitioner, and I just want to say that 
anything I speak about as a practitioner, the clinical students here 
at the law school have all worked in exactly the same capacity. 
So I’m speaking as a practitioner and also as a clinical professor. 
The first question is how does domestic violence affect 
criminal practice? I’m going to speak about that from three 
perspectives: the prosecution perspective; the defense 
perspective; and then quickly about the policy and planning 
perspective. 
From the prosecution perspective, the impact is so dramatic 
that it’s really hard to describe. So I’m just going to tell you a 
little bit about statistics for one moment to give you a sense of 
impact. 
Some of the changes that have occurred over the last few 
years, and the reason that we’ve had this tremendous impact 
change can be attributed to one thing, which is the mandatory 
arrest law in New York State.31 Most of you are aware of that 
                                                          
31 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 140.10(4) (McKinney 2003). New York’s 
mandatory arrest law requires, generally, that a police officer perform a 
mandatory arrest when the officer has reasonable cause to believe that a 
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fact, but mandatory arrest also applies in domestic violence 
situations32 and this has increased the number of arrests 
dramatically.33 Additionally, and I think probably more 
importantly, a lot of the work done by people like Professor 
Schneider and many of you in the audience has brought much 
attention to domestic violence and increased awareness and the 
number of arrests.34 These are obviously some of the reasons 
                                                          
person has committed a crime against a member of the same family or 
household, or has an order of protection in effect. Id. It also addresses arrest 
without a warrant by police officer, when and where it is authorized. Id. 
32 This practice has been met with varying sentiments. Compare Alison 
B. Veerland, The Criminalization of Child Welfare in New York City: Sparing 
the Child or Spoiling the Family?, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1053, 1060-61 
(2000) (asserting that the mandatory arrest law has given endangered women a 
reliable source of assistance because the police no longer ask the woman 
whether or not she wants to press charges before arresting the alleged abuser), 
with Kevin Walsh, The Mandatory Arrest Law: Police Reaction, 16 PACE L. 
REV. 97, 105-06 (1995) (stating that the mandatory arrest law brings an influx 
of arrests into the criminal justice system, many of which prosecutors fail to 
aggressively prosecute, resulting in charges being dropped and, consequently, 
less incentive for officers to arrest in domestic violence situations). 
33 See ADRIANA FERNANDEZ-LANIER ET AL., NEW YORK DIVISION OF 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVICES, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: RESEARCH IN REVIEW, 
COMPARISON OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE REPORTING AND ARREST RATES IN NEW 
YORK STATE: ANALYSIS OF THE 1997 AND 2000 DOMESTIC INCIDENT 
STATISTICAL DATABASES (2001), available at http://criminaljustice.state.ny. 
us/crimnet/ojsa/domviol_rinr/index.htm#15 (last visited Apr. 3, 2003) (finding 
that in jurisdictions without pro-arrest policies the arrest rate ranged from 4 to 
12 percent whereas in newly legislated pro-arrest jurisdictions the range was 
15 to 30 percent); NEW YORK DIVISION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVICES, 
FAMILY PROTECTION AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE INTERVENTION ACT OF 1994: 
EVALUATION OF THE MANDATORY ARREST PROVISIONS, SECOND INTERIM 
REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE LEGISLATURE (1998). 
34 See DALTON & SCHNEIDER, supra note 4 (surveying the first legal 
casebook on domestic violence and exploring domestic violence’s relationship 
with family law, criminal law, tort liability, civil rights and international 
human rights); Elizabeth M. Schneider & Susan B. Jordan, Representation of 
Women Who Defend Themselves in Response to Physical or Sexual Assault, 4 
WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 149, 153-63 (1978) (advising attorneys representing 
battered women who have committed homicides after sexual or physical abuse 
of ways in which to effectively defend the women); Elizabeth M. Schneider, 
Equal Rights to Trial for Women: Sex-Bias in the Law of Self-Defense, 15 
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why we have the mandatory arrest law.35 
So to give you a sense of impact, in 1996, and I think these 
statistics are approximately correct, there were maybe about 
5,000 domestic violence prosecutions in Brooklyn and maybe a 
little less in Manhattan, Bronx, and Queens.36 After that, in 1997, 
1998, 1999, you were looking at about 12,000 prosecutions.37 As 
you can see, there was an incredible change and obviously that 
change has significantly impacted the criminal justice system in a 
tremendous way. 
                                                          
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 623, 635-42 (1980) (arguing that individualization 
of self-defense law can help to equalize treatment for battered women raising 
self-defense claims); Elizabeth M. Schneider, Describing and Changing: 
Women’s Self-Defense Work and the Problem of Expert Testimony on 
Battering, 9 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 195, 198-200 (1986) (suggesting that 
homicide cases in which expert testimony is offered to support a battered 
woman’s self-defense claim “pose a dilemma of how we describe both 
victimization and agency in women’s lives”). See generally NATHAN A. 
ROSEN, NATIONAL CENTER FOR WOMEN & FAMILY LAW, BATTERED WIVES: 
A COMPREHENSIVE ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY OF ARTICLES, BOOKS AND 
STATUTES IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (1988) (listing and briefly 
describing numerous works on the subject of domestic violence); Nancy Egan, 
The Police Response to Spouse Abuse: A Selective, Annotated Bibliography, 91 
LAW LIBR. J. 499 (1999) (documenting bibliographically the trends in the 
ongoing research and debate in the area of the police response to spouse 
abuse). 
35 See, e.g., Symposium, Women, Children and Domestic Violence: 
Current Tensions and Emerging Issues, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 567, 629-72 
(2000) (explaining the judicial and legislative origins of the Mandatory Arrest 
Law). See also Lawrence W. Sherman & Richard A. Berk, The Minneapolis 
Domestic Violence Experiment, POLICE FOUNDATION REPORTS (1984), 
available at http://www.policefoundation.org/pdf/minneapolisdve.pdf (last 
visited Apr. 3, 2003) (finding that mandatory arrest was most effective of 
three standard police methods for reducing domestic violence, which created 
an increase in mandatory arrest legislation in several states). 
36 Statistics provided by Office of the Kings County DA Domestic 
Violence Bureau. 
37 Statistics provided by Office of the Kings County DA Domestic 
Violence Bureau, available at http://www.brooklynda.org/Domestic%20 
Violence/DV.htm (last visited Apr. 3, 2003) (reporting nearly 500 felony and 
12,000 misdemeanor domestic violence cases prosecuted in 1998 by the Kings 
County DA Domestic Violence Bureau, and over the past two years, the 
felony dismissal rate has averaged 4.7 percent). 
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Years ago, when domestic violence cases came into the 
system and even though there weren’t that many, in fact, very 
few, they were routinely disposed of immediately.38 When I say 
disposed of, I mean dismissed. What you would see in every 
criminal court across the entire country was this exact scenario.39 
They would call the case to the calendar. The defendant would be 
there and he would come up with his attorney. You would also 
see the prosecutor there. Somebody would say, “Your Honor, 
this is a D.V. case.” The next person you would see is the 
victim—who was always in the audience—approach. The judge 
                                                          
38 During the 1980s, studies reported that 50 to 80 percent of domestic 
violence cases were dismissed. See RICHARD R. PETERSON ET AL., NEW YORK 
CITY CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCY, COMPARING THE PROCESSING OF DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE CASES TO NON-DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CASES IN NEW YORK CITY 
CRIMINAL COURTS, NEW YORK CITY CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCY FINAL 
REPORT 3 (2001), available at http://www. nycja.org/research/reports/dv01. 
pdf (last visited Apr. 3, 2003) (listing common reasons for the high dismissal 
rate, including prosecutors’ perceptions of domestic violence as a private 
matter and less serious than crimes against strangers, the reluctance of victims 
to cooperate by pressing charges or testifying against the batterer either before 
or during prosecution, and the difficulty in establishing strong evidence in 
domestic violence cases where the abuse often takes place in the home with no 
witnesses other than the parties to the incident). 
39 The prevalence of this scenario has been noted elsewhere, cf. Elizabeth 
Barravecchia, Expanding the Warrantless Arrest Exception to Dating 
Relationships, 32 MCGEORGE L. REV. 579, 582 (2001) (noting that while 
many battered women who summon police while under an attack later recant 
their stories once the officers arrive, those that allow an arrest to occur will 
often drop the charges soon after); Deborah Epstein, Effective Intervention in 
Domestic Violence Cases: Rethinking the Roles of Prosecutors, Judges, and 
the Court System, 11 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 3, 39 (1999) (stating that victims 
in domestic violence cases frequently drop their suits); Cheryl Hanna, The 
Paradox of Hope: The Crime and Punishment of Domestic Violence, 39 WM & 
MARY L. REV. 1505, 1520 (1998) (reasoning that the lack of domestic 
violence prosecution stems from several factors, including a victim’s refusal to 
testify against her abuser); Nancy James, Domestic Violence: A History of 
Arrest Policies and a Survey of Modern Law, 28 FAM. L.Q. 509, 513 (1994) 
(noting that if a woman does insist that her abuser be arrested, she will 
frequently telephone the jail the following day and ask that he be released from 
custody, or, if prosecution has already commenced, she commonly requests 
that the charges be dropped). 
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would say usually, “Is the victim in the audience?” She would 
come up. The judge would say, “Why are you here?” And the 
victim would respond, “I want to dismiss the charges.”40 The 
judge’s response would surprise many of you because you’re 
very young, and so it is going to sound ridiculous but this is 
exactly how the scenario would go. The judge would respond by 
saying, “Has anybody threatened you to force you to drop the 
charges?” And she would, of course, say “No.” The judge would 
then say, “Is there any reason other than your own willingness to 
drop the charges that you’re dropping the charges?”41 And she 
would say, “No, it’s my free will.” The judge would then ask, 
“Has anybody forced you to drop the charges?” She would again 
say, “No.” The judge would say, “Case dismissed,” and that was 
the end of it. 
So from that scenario you can see that even if there was an 
                                                          
40 Barravecchia, supra note 39, at 582; Epstein, supra note 39, at 39; 
Hanna, supra note 39, at 1520; James, supra note 39, at 513. 
41 Others have noted domestic violence victims’ unwillingness to press 
charges against their abusers. See, e.g., Gena L. Durham, The Domestic 
Violence Dilemma: How Our Ineffective and Varied Responses Reflect Our 
Conflicted Views of the Problem, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 641, 651 (1998) (noting 
that domestic violence victims are often overwhelmed with feelings of guilt 
relating to the prospect of putting their husbands or boyfriends in jail and are 
therefore less likely to cooperate with prosecutors); Cheryl Hanna, No Right to 
Choose: Mandated Victim Participation in Domestic Violence Prosecutions, 
109 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1996) (discussing that prosecutors have begun to 
implement mandatory victim participation policies in domestic violence cases 
as a response to the high number of dismissals that occur when a victim is 
asked whether or not she would like to proceed and that victim non-
cooperation, reluctance or outright refusal to proceed are the major reasons for 
lack of criminal prosecution); Judith S. Kaye & Susan K. Knipps, Judicial 
Responses to Domestic Violence: The Case for a Problem Solving Approach, 
27 W. ST. U. L. REV. 1 (2000) (pointing out that unlike victims of random 
attacks, battered women often have compelling reasons for dismissing the 
charges against their attackers including fear, economic dependence, and 
affection, which makes these cases difficult to prosecute); Julia Weber, Courts 
Responding to Communities: Domestic Violence Courts Components and 
Considerations, 2 J. CENT. CHILD. & CTS. 23 (2000) (arguing that a “no-
drop” policy of domestic violence prosecution recognizes that the dynamics of 
domestic violence are such that perpetrators may try to coerce their partners 
into not cooperating with partners). 
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arrest, the case was gone by the first court date.42 So those cases 
had no impact in criminal justice—and none in prosecution—for 
many, many years. So from the prosecution standpoint, there has 
been a sea change because you have this tremendous increase in 
arrests and, more importantly, you don’t have that dismissal 
scenario anymore.43 Therefore, not only are there arrests but also 
there’s a lot of work put into the cases in a lot of courts. 
You now see that in the criminal courts it’s very common to 
have domestic violence cases represent about fifteen percent of 
the court’s caseload.44 So you can see that that has made a 
                                                          
42 See Randal B. Fritzler & Leonore M.J. Simon, Creating a Domestic 
Violence Court: Combat in the Trenches, 37 CT. REV. 28, 29 (2000) (stating 
that domestic violence cases have had higher dismissal rates and less serious 
sentences compared to other violent crimes); Donna Wills, Mandatory 
Prosecution in Domestic Violence Cases: Domestic Violence: The Case for 
Aggressive Prosecution, 7 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 173, 177 (1997) (noting that 
the “great majority of domestic violence victims have one characteristic in 
common: after making the initial report, they have neither the will nor the 
courage to assist prosecutors in holding the abusers criminally responsible” 
and that they frequently recant their charge, minimize the abuse or simply fail 
to appear in court). 
43 See FERNANDEZ-LANIER, supra note 33 (describing the increase in 
arrest rates resulting from implementation of mandatory arrest laws). See also 
Press Release, New York State Unified Court System, $1 Million in Federal 
and State Grants Allow Expansion of Domestic Violence Courts in New York 
City (June 25, 1998). As of 1997, Brooklyn Supreme Court Domestic 
Violence Part had a dismissal rate of 3.7 percent, a considerably low rate 
since domestic violence cases are typically dismissed because the witnesses are 
reluctant to testify. Id. See also supra note 37-38 and accompanying text 
(reporting the decline in dismissals of domestic violence cases in the Kings 
County DA Domestic Violence Bureau). 
44 Judge Morgenstern stated that “in the Brooklyn Criminal Court, we 
arraign over 100,000 cases every year. One out of every five cases is a 
domestic violence case. . . . In New York City, in 1997, there were over 
250,000 Domestic Incident Reports (DIRs) filed. In 1998, we had almost 
300,000 DIRs,” although not all of these resulted in arrest and prosecution. 
See Symposium, Women, Children, and Domestic Violence: Current Tensions 
and Emerging Issues, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 565, 684 (2000). At the end of 
2002, there were more than 110,000 cases pending citywide in the criminal 
courts. Of that number, 22,166 were domestic violence prosecutions. Statistics 
provided by the Office of the Administrative Judge of the Criminal Courts of 
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significant change for the courts and for everybody. So it’s a 
change in the courts, and additionally, because of that—and all of 
this sort of follows—there are now quite a few specialized courts. 
So there are specialty felony domestic violence courts.45 There 
are specialized misdemeanor domestic violence courts.46 So 
additionally, the court system has moved all of these cases out of 
the general court calendar and they are now in special parts. So 
that’s also a change. Actually, with the exception of drugs in 
some jurisdictions, there isn’t any other substantive field that has 
its own court part in the same way that domestic violence does.47 
                                                          
the City of New York. 
45 See NEW YORK STATE DIVISION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVICES, NEW 
YORK STATE’S DOMESTIC VIOLENCE COURTS PROGRAM FACT SHEET (2000), 
available at http://criminaljustice.state.ny.us/ofpa/pdfdocs/domviolcourt.pdf 
(last visited Apr. 3, 2003). The increasing number of domestic violence cases 
filed prompted the establishment of special courts to adjudicate these issues, 
and Felony Domestic Violence Courts currently exist in Brooklyn, Bronx, and 
Queens. Id. The Brooklyn Domestic Violence Court, which opened in June 
1996, served as a model for other domestic violence courts in New York state. 
Id. See also Center for Court Innovation, Brooklyn Domestic Violence Court, 
available at http://www.courtinnovation.org/demo_04bdvc.html (last visited 
Apr. 3, 2003). 
46 See NEW YORK STATE DIVISION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVICES, NEW 
YORK STATE’S DOMESTIC VIOLENCE COURTS PROGRAM FACT SHEET (2000), 
available at http://criminaljustice.state.ny.us/ofpa/pdfdocs/domviolcourt.pdf 
(last visited Apr. 3, 2003). Misdemeanor Domestic Violence Courts were 
established in Brooklyn, Bronx, Queens and Manhattan; these courts focus 
attention on the victim, assessing the level of potential danger that an offender 
may pose since the charges may not reflect the gravity of harm that the victim 
may be exposed to. Id. See also Betsy Tsai, The Trend Toward Specialized 
Domestic Violence Courts: Improvements on an Effective Innovation, 68 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1285 (2000) (describing the staffing and composition of 
domestic violence courts with the goal to ensure that the judge and the 
prosecution teams are promptly aware of any crisis and facilitate a rapid and 
stringent measure to protect the victims). 
47 See, e.g., OFFICE OF COURT OF DRUG TREATMENT, THE FIRST YEAR 
REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUDGE (2002), available at http://www.courts.state.ny. 
us/1styrdc.pdf (last visited Apr. 3, 2003) (documenting the achievements of 
the Office of Court of Drug Treatment in New York, created to address cycle 
of addiction and recidivism in drug-related crime). See also OFFICE OF 
NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY, SUMMARY OF DRUG COURT ACTIVITY BY 
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So that’s also a very significant change. 
Now, those changes have obviously impacted everything. For 
instance, in almost every prosecutor’s office there are separate 
domestic violence bureaus.48 Therefore, if you’re a student and 
you’re interested in working in domestic violence—and this again 
applies to all the students in the clinics—and you want to do 
domestic violence as a prosecutor, you can volunteer to be in the 
domestic violence bureau. It’s interesting because for some 
people that’s the first thing they want to do when they get to a 
prosecutor’s office. For others, they’d rather stay as far away 
from that as possible because, of course, they want to do 
something really interesting like vehicle and traffic law cases. So 
I always find that dichotomy very odd. But that’s the truth. 
I’m here as a practitioner. So I’m going to tell you about 
practice. You have that in almost every prosecutor’s office across 
                                                          
STATE AND COUNTY, OJP DRUG COURT CLEARINGHOUSE AND TECHNICAL 
ASSISTANCE PROJECT (2002) (providing detailed information about the number 
of drug courts that have been operating for over two years, have recently been 
implemented, or are being planned in each state). 
48 See Office of the Bronx District Attorney, available at 
http://www.bronxda.net/about_the_office/organizational_glossary.html (last 
visited Apr. 3, 2003); Office of the Brooklyn District Attorney, available at 
http://www.brooklynda.org/domestic%20violence/dv.html (last visited Apr. 
3, 2003) (“the Domestic Violence Bureau handles prosecution of all 
misdemeanor and felony domestic violence cases as well as domestic violence 
homicides.”); Office of the Manhattan District Attorney, available at 
http://manhattanda.org/office_overview/trail/legal/fam_violence_right.html 
(last visited Apr. 3, 2003) (describing its Family Violence and Child Abuse 
Bureau as in charge of investigating and prosecuting crimes involving 
domestic violence); Office of the Nassau District Attorney, available at 
http://www.nassauda.org/DAWebpage/AnnualReports/sex_offense_and_dome
stic_violence_bereau_html (last visited Apr. 3, 2003) (explaining that the Sex 
Offense and Domestic Violence Bureau prosecutes all felony domestic 
violence cases and selected misdemeanors); Office of the Queens District 
Attorney, available at http://www.queensda.org/DivisionsandBureaus.html 
(last visited Apr. 3, 2003) (stating that the “Domestic Violence Bureau 
prosecutes misdemeanor and felony cases involving domestic partners”); 
Office of the Suffolk District Attorney, available at http://www.co.suffolk.ny. 
us/da/about.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2003) (“Family Crime Bureau is 
responsible for the prosecution of all cases involving intimate partner and 
family violence”). 
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the country now. Another thing that’s very interesting to think 
about—in the way this has changed everything dramatically—is 
that domestic violence has really inspired the criminal justice 
system to think about cases in a different way, which simply is 
something called evidence-based prosecutions.49 This is 
something I’m going to address very, very quickly. 
Now, you’re all familiar with the fact that many victims in 
domestic violence prosecutions do not want to press charges. 
That used to be the really easy way to get rid of your caseload. If 
somebody gave you ten domestic violence cases and you just 
wrote on each case, “complaining witness doesn’t wish to 
prosecute,” it was dismissed. That was the way it was. 
That is not the way it is anymore.50 In the clinic that I teach—
                                                          
49 One example of the Nassau County District Attorney’s policy of 
“evidence based prosecution” is a case in 2000 where a defendant was indicted 
“through the use of audiotapes of 911 calls and police observation testimony,” 
even though the complainant did not cooperate. See Office of the Nassau 
District Attorney, Sex Offense and Domestic Violence Bureau, available at 
http://www.nassauda.org/DAWebpage/AnnualReports/sex_offense_and_dome
stic_violence_bereau_html (last visited Apr. 3, 2003) (stating that the bureau 
responsible for domestic violence cases “prosecutes to the fullest extent 
possible even when the complainant refuses to cooperate.”). See also Office of 
the Queens District Attorney, available at 
http://www.queensda.org/DivisionsandBureaus.html (last visited Apr. 3, 
2003) (stating that Assistant District Attorneys “have proceeded to trial on 
cases without the cooperation or testimony of the victim, where there existed 
other adequate and admissible evidence to support the charges.”). See 
RICHARD R. PETERSON, NEW YORK CITY CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCY, CROSS-
BOROUGH DIFFERENCES IN THE PROCESSING OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CASES IN 
NEW YORK CITY CRIMINAL COURTS (2002), available at http://www.nycja. 
org/research/reports/boro2r36.pdf (last visited Apr. 3, 2003). In the Bronx, 
the Assistant District Attorneys (ADAs) primarily prosecuted cases in which 
the domestic violence victims signed the complaint. Id. In Brooklyn, however, 
ADAs prosecuted virtually all domestic violence cases pursuant to a no-drop 
policy. Id. In the Bronx, only 80 percent of domestic violence arrests resulted 
in prosecution, while in Brooklyn, 99 percent resulted in prosecution. Id. As a 
result of prosecuting only the cases that the domestic violence victims choose 
to cooperate, the conviction rate in the Bronx is 64 percent; in Brooklyn, it is 
only 18 percent. Id. 
50 See PETERSON, supra note 49 (indicating that Brooklyn’s ADAs’ no-
drop prosecution policy produced a 99 percent prosecution rate, which was 19 
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the Prosecutors’ Clinic—where we work primarily on domestic 
violence cases, we look at each case to see if it’s triable without 
the victim, as well as with the victim. I’d say that as a theory and 
as a practice, there are many people who are in favor of it,51 and 
many who aren’t.52 That would be the subject for an entire 
                                                          
percent higher as compared to the Bronx ADA’s office who primarily only 
prosecuted cases in which the domestic violence victims signed the complaint). 
See also Hanna, supra note 41, at 1860-64. “Many [prosecutor’s] offices now 
have pro-prosecution or ‘no-drop’ policies. . . . Some states have adopted pro-
prosecution legislation, and many others have officially endorsed its 
adoption.” Id. “These policies actively encourage women to proceed through 
the criminal justice system.” Id. 
51 At least four states have adopted legislation encouraging no-drop 
policies. See FLA. STAT. ch. 741.2901 (2002) (requiring the adoption of “pro-
prosecution” policies and permitting the prosecuting attorney to disregard 
victim reluctance when deciding whether to pursue a case); MINN. STAT. § 
611A.0311 (2002) (requiring all county and city attorneys to develop 
prosecution plans that address methods for gathering evidence other than the 
victim’s in-court testimony); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-36-3 (2003) (disallowing 
judicial dismissal of a domestic violence case at a victim’s request unless there 
is “reasonable cause” to think that the victim would “benefit”); WIS. STAT. § 
968.075 (2002) (directing all district attorneys offices to “develop, adopt and 
implement written policies” that are not based on the victim’s consent to 
prosecute a domestic abuse case). Other states have encouraged more 
aggressive prosecution of domestic violence cases but do not specifically 
address the impact of victim participation on prosecutorial decisions. See, 
e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 273.8 (2003) (allocating funds for use by district 
and city attorneys’ offices under the Spousal Abuser Prosecution Program); 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-18 (2002) (encouraging broad application of 
remedies in criminal courts for domestic violence cases). See also Hanna, 
supra note 41, at 1860-64 (advocating aggressive prosecution of domestic 
violence but proposing that “rather than focus exclusively on whether the 
victim is willing to testify at trial, prosecutors should develop strategies aimed 
at gathering evidence that will overcome the presumption of innocence in 
criminal cases. A proper investigation can reduce the likelihood that the victim 
will ever have to take the stand.”). 
52 For further analysis of varying viewpoints, see Renee L. Rold, All 
States Should Adopt Spousal Privilege Exception Statutes, 55 J. MO. B. 249, 
249 (1999) (examining the concept of spousal privilege, discussing the various 
statutes in jurisdictions enacted to enforce compelled victim testimony in 
spousal domestic violence cases, and suggesting that compulsion statute 
wrongly takes the decision to testify out of the victim’s hands); Renee 
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separate panel. But we do that, and that’s changed things 
dramatically too. Because, if you can imagine, you were 
previously just dismissing all those cases, and now you’re 
actually thinking about trying each of them with or without the 
victim. This doubles and triples the work, and tripled the work 
for every prosecutor.53 But it’s very interesting and it obviously 
gives you a huge amount of experience with evidence, criminal 
procedure, and trials. In fact—and this is not such a good story 
since it is an odd story—but a couple of years ago, one of the 
students from Brooklyn Law School was in the Prosecutors 
Clinic and he had a domestic violence case where the victim was 
uncooperative. We tried that case and the defendant was given 
probation. Oddly enough, and not because we even knew about 
it, two years later—and that was with one girlfriend—two years 
later he got re-arrested for beating up his new girlfriend. The 
case just happened to come to us and I recognized the name of 
the defendant. And now we are involved in trying to prosecute 
him for violating his sentence of probation. 
I’m just going to quickly say that, from the defense 
perspective, bringing all of these cases creates much more work 
on the defense side. But there are a lot of very interesting areas 
to work on in the defense side of domestic violence. For one 
thing, mandatory arrest has done something unfortunate—it also 
causes a lot of cross-complaints where the woman gets arrested at 
the same time as the man.54 This is because the cops get to the 
                                                          
Romkens, Law as a Trojan Horse: Unintended Consequences of Rights-Based 
Interventions to Support Battered Women, 13 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 265 
(2001) (emphasizing the growing acknowledgment among feminist legal 
scholars that mandatory arrest and prosecution policies present nd problems 
that deserve critical attention when developing policies to help protect 
victims). 
53 Cf. Richard D. Friedman & Bridget McCormack, Dial-In Testimony, 
150 U. PA. L. REV. 1171, 1188 (2002) (noting that greater arrest incentives, 
mandatory arrests and increased state record keeping requirements in domestic 
violence have resulted in a dramatic increase in arrests of both men and 
women, with increases running as high as 431 percent over one decade in one 
large California county). 
54 “Retaliatory arrests are very difficult because it does not obviously 
present itself to either the police officer or to the District Attorney’s office at 
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scene and they’re not sure who to arrest.55 So there’s a lot of 
defense work of women who are being arrested under mandatory 
arrest as well as under retaliatory complaints.56 
I’m just going to quickly go through some of the problems I 
wish I had known as a practitioner before entering the practice. 
There are three things. You have to have a lot of patience and 
tenacity. You have to be really interested, and you have to 
                                                          
that moment that there is a situation where we have got to sort out which one 
it was.” Symposium, Women, Children, and Domestic Violence: Current 
Tensions and Emerging Issues, supra note 44, at 685. Furthermore, in 
domestic violence situations, “[w]hen cross-complaints are filed in court, the 
District Attorney’s hands are tied because both parties want to end the matter 
in court, albeit for very different reasons. The District Attorneys cannot 
communicate with either party without their attorneys present and the cases 
are labeled “ACD” (adjourned in contemplation of dismissal) with limited 
orders or dismissed outright.” Id. 
55 See id. Judge Morgenstern explained that “[w]hen the domestic 
violence officers would show up at that point, they would now have to make 
an assessment as to who was the primary initial aggressor in the situation.” Id. 
See also Joan Zorza, The Criminal Law of Misdemeanor Domestic Violence, 
83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 46, 57-60 (1992) (noting that the director of 
the country’s first batterer’s treatment program testified before the Gender 
Bias Study of the court system in Massachusetts that virtually every woman 
referred to the program was a victim wrongly accused by the batterer of being 
the aggressor). 
56 A lawyer from Sanctuary for Families, Center for Battered Women’s 
Legal Services, noted: 
[i]n the early 1990s, it used to be that my primary assistance to my 
clients was helping them convince the police to arrest the men who 
had abused them. I find myself now in the position of spending most 
of my time helping my clients not get arrested on retaliatory charges 
made by their abuser. I find that the mandatory arrest law is being 
used as a tool by abusers against women.” 
Symposium, Women, Children, and Domestic Violence: Current Tensions and 
Emerging Issues, supra note 44, at 686. However, Professor Lisa Smith, 
Director of Brooklyn Law School’s Criminal Clinical Program, emphasized 
that the New York City Police Department has done special training in 
Brooklyn on the primary aggressor law, and there has actually “been a drop in 
cross-complaints in the courts, so much so that the judges actually 
independently mentioned to me one day that they had noticed that the cross-
complaints were dropping dramatically.” Id. 
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understand that you’re opening a Pandora’s box when you’re 
working in the field because you have to be willing to think about 
yourself as a social worker, and as a psychologist.57 You have to 
understand the cultural problems,58 language barriers,59 and other 
barriers because people come in with a lot of handicaps and 
disabilities.60 You have to be willing to be the kind of lawyer who 
                                                          
57 See Ann Shalleck, Theory and Experience in Constructing the 
Relationship Between Lawyer and Client: Representing Women Who Have 
Been Abused, 64 TENN. L. REV. 1019, 1062 (1997) (noting that clinical 
practice can help prepare lawyers for legal representation of women who have 
been abused and pointing out that the practice involves a synthesis of elements 
beyond purely legal rights and remedies, including a client’s vision of herself, 
her experiences and her needs). 
58 Violence against women is not limited by borders, culture, class, 
education, socio-economic level or immigration status. For women and their 
children who have immigrated to the United States, the dangers faced in 
abusive relationships are often more acute; immigrant women not only face 
pressures of cultural assimilation but also pressures of maintaining cultural 
traditions, language barriers, economic insecurity and discrimination due to 
gender, race or ethnicity. See Leslye E. Orloff & Janice v. Kaguyutan, 
Offering A Helping Hand Legal Protections for Battered Immigrant Women a 
History of Legislative Responses, 10 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 95 
(2000). 
59 There is a lack of multilingual services provided to domestic violence 
victims. Battered women may be forced to locate their own interpreters and a 
victim may be forced to rely on community or family members who may be 
connected to her batterer. Even if service is obtained, language may interfere 
with the provision of adequate services; a limited-English speaker may find it 
difficult to discuss her experiences with a monolingual-English-speaking 
counselor or to live for a prolonged period in a shelter where only English is 
spoken. See Karin Wang, Battered Asian American Women: Community 
Responses from the Battered Women’s Movement and the Asian American 
Community, 3 ASIAN L.J. 151, 165 (1996). See also Berta E. Hernandez-
Truyol, Las Olvidadas—Gendered in Justice/Gendered Injustice: Latinas, 
Fronteras and the Law, 1 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 354, 384 (1998). 
Hernandez-Truyol notes that “[i]mmigrant Latinas who are victims of 
domestic violence doubly suffer from such lack of services.” She posits that 
“language difficulties or undocumented status can interfere with obtaining 
information about services or gaining access to services that is compounded by 
the additional obstacles of a possible inability to communicate with service 
providers or fear of deportation for themselves.” Id. 
60 See Conference, Revolutions Within Communities: The Fifth Annual 
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doesn’t say, “I’m just doing criminal. I don’t need to know about 
Medicare benefits, the school system, family court,” etcetera.61 
Because you’re going to need to know about every single thing 
that people are going to discuss here. Thank you. 
                                                          
Domestic Violence Conference: Mainstream Legal Responses To Domestic 
Violence vs. Real Needs of Diverse Communities, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J., 54-
55 (2001). Holly Devine, director of a program at New York City’s Barrier 
Free Living that specializes in working with disabled victims of domestic 
violence, noted: 
[d]isabled women are dependent upon their abusers for everything, 
and their abusers in most cases are their caregivers . . . . Their 
abusers or caregivers may restrict their access to transportation. 
Caregivers may withhold wheelchairs and medications, refuse to 
assist with personal needs, leave their partners in bed all day and not 
get them up to go to the bathroom, resist access to friends, those sorts 
of neglectful type activities. So here is a disabled person who is 
dependent upon their abuser. If they report the abuse, they lose the 
person who gets them out of bed every day. They may lose their 
children as well, because if they go to a shelter, if there is one 
accessible for them, their children will have to go into foster care or 
some other place. For all these reasons, on top of their isolation, 
women with disabilities really do not have a lot of options and are 
often fearful of reporting the abuse, which is why they stay in 
dangerous situations significantly longer than non-disabled women. A 
disabled woman will stay in an abusive situation 8.3 years versus 4.1 
years for a non-disabled woman. 
Id. Additionally, seven years ago, SafePlace, a Texas-based organization 
recognized that disabled women were victims of domestic violence at a higher 
rate than the general population. See Chuck Lindell, Grants Will Help Abuse 
Victims Who Are Disabled, AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN, Mar. 5, 2003, at 
B1. “Women with disabilities are easier to victimize and harder to help 
afterward, a devastating combination that Austin-based SafePlace has 
struggled for seven years to correct . . . SafePlace last year won U.S. Justice 
Department approval to run a national program helping disabled victims of 
domestic violence.” Id. 
61 To effectively provide for the needs of a battered client, a lawyer must 
consider, among other things, child support, child custody, the psychological 
impact on the client and the client’s safety. See, e.g., Linda G. Mills, On the 
Other Side of Silence: Affective Lawyering for Intimate Abuse, 81 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1225 (1996) (arguing that traditional legalistic approach to domestic 
violence is ineffective and insensitive to the complex circumstances that give 
rise to violence in intimate relationships). 
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Professor Anthony Sebok 
Thank you. I’m very honored to be asked to speak on this 
issue. It is an issue which actually I see as continuous with a 
larger question, which has to do with the relationship between 
tort law, the education we receive in tort law and its application 
to larger questions of social policy. 
I think that one of the lessons in looking at a typical casebook 
in tort law or looking at a syllabus is that concealed underneath 
what appears to be a rather technical and formal set of concepts 
are an incredible array of substantive decisions that are made by 
courts, both at the level of judges and juries. And these decisions 
get codified, and concretized in appellate decisions, which are 
then taught to you in your casebook. 
The problem with thinking about domestic violence from the 
perspective of tort law is, I think, the following. Clearly, the 
concepts which you want to learn in order to be a skilled torts 
lawyer—or just a lawyer in general, so that you know what the 
practice of civil liability looks like—are broad. And in fact, the 
broadest and most important category really has to do with 
accident law. Accident law has a number of deep concepts which 
don’t necessarily hook up directly with what you might think of 
as the primary area of interest for someone who is concerned 
about domestic violence issues. But even here there is a bit of a 
confusion. Because actually many of the concepts that need to be 
raised in thinking about negligence law hide serious questions 
about power and the distribution of power in society. 
Currently, feminist scholars have written a great deal about 
critiques of the tort system, mostly from the perspective of 
looking at the negligence law system. However, within tort law 
there is also the whole issue of intentional torts. I remember 
when I began teaching torts, Regina Austin, a critical race 
scholar at the University of Pennsylvania School of Law, and a 
critical legal studies scholar, told me that she spends much of her 
time in her first-year torts class talking about intentional torts. 
I was a little surprised by this. But she explained to me that 
many scholars who are progressive gravitate towards the 
DVSYMPOSIUMXX.DOC 7/7/03  11:06 AM 
 DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN LEGAL EDUCATION 445 
intentional torts section of the first-year course. And the reason 
for that is, of course, that with intentional torts there are an awful 
lot of opportunities to think about how violence is visited upon 
people who do not have real access to the criminal justice system, 
and also how in intentional torts there may be creative ways to at 
least recognize and perhaps even remedy the exercise of 
violence. 
There is not as much scholarship on intentional torts from a 
feminist perspective as there ought to be, but there are a handful 
of wonderful articles. I would point out in particular Clare 
Dalton’s wonderful piece from 1997,62 and also a recent piece by 
Jennifer Wriggins in the University of Southern California Law 
Review called Domestic Violence Torts.63 I’ve learned an awful 
lot about how to think about intentional torts by reading works 
like these. 
Now, in talking about the things that you might want to learn 
from your torts course, an advanced torts class or thinking 
further about torts on your own, and then of course talking to 
torts practitioners like Betty Levinson, who is here today to speak 
with us, I want to just point out that there is an incredible array 
of ways in which the interactions between married and unmarried 
                                                          
62 Clare Dalton, Domestic Violence, Domestic Torts and Divorce: 
Constraints and Possibilities, 31 NEW ENG. L. REV. 319 (1997) (examining 
the obstacles to intentional torts suits brought by the abused spouses). The 
article begins with a proposal that the removal of interspousal immunity does 
not leave spouses free to sue one another in intentional tort claims. Id. at 321. 
Proceeding from the premise that there is a huge difference between simply 
removing the obvious discrimination against such plaintiffs embodied in the 
interspousal tort immunity and making the tort system genuinely hospitable to 
them, it directs possible solutions to practitioners, judges and legislatures, 
involving significant redesign of the tort system. Id. at 323. 
63 Jennifer Wriggins, Domestic Violence Torts, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 121 
(2001) (offering an approach to civil liability for domestic violence torts 
through insurance reform because standard liability insurance policies, which 
generally do not cover domestic violence torts, are one of the reasons for the 
surprisingly small number of tort suits compared to the frequency with which 
people are injured by domestic violence). The article proposes procedural 
changes as a part of the solution for better access to the justice system. Id. at 
176. It also addresses the relative lack of deterrence and compensation that the 
tort system and insurance policies provide domestic violence torts. Id. at 124. 
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individuals who have a domestic relationship manifest themselves 
as torts. 
To list just the intentional torts—and I apologize if this is 
going to sound like a quick look at the table of contents of your 
bar review course book—there are battery, assault, intentional 
infliction of emotional distress and false imprisonment. There is 
also a whole way of categorizing many of these intentional acts 
as negligence, for reasons which I’ll explain in a moment. That is 
just in the personal injuries areas. False imprisonment is 
technically personal injury. 
Then in privacy and defamation, you can claim privacy 
violations within the domestic context just like one can claim 
privacy violations between strangers. You have to plead it right, 
but you could. Similarly there are, of course, opportunities for 
slander and libel, since disputes between individuals involving a 
great deal of vitriol do actually manifest themselves in false 
statements made about each other. Finally—and I wonder how 
much we will have a chance to talk about this today—there is a 
very interesting area in which some aspects of both divorce law 
and also relations between unmarried couples present questions 
about fraud and conversion, because property is involved. And so 
you have the whole panoply of common law tort brought in the 
interaction between individuals who have domestic relations with 
each other. 
Now, the bad news is that one reason why many cases don’t 
seem to present themselves in your torts casebook this way—for 
example, we could of course think about some cases that could 
have been, like the famous Tarasoff case, is an example of a 
boyfriend murdering an ex-girlfriend.64 Or the whole question 
about subjective versus objective judgment in defense in battery 
could also be raised in that context. 
But I’m not going to sugarcoat this. It doesn’t happen too 
often. And why it doesn’t happen too often is not just because of 
                                                          
64 Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976) 
(holding that when a psychotherapist determines or should determine that his 
patient presents a serious danger of violence to another person, the 
psychotherapist has a duty to use reasonable care to protect the intended victim 
against such danger). 
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the inherent sexism of the casebook authors, although that might 
be an explanation. It is also because—and here we’ll have to 
speak with Ms. Levinson about this—there are certain very 
simple barriers as to why a large volume of cases do not make it 
up into the appellate courts, and maybe not even to filings and 
I’m going to briefly mention them. I think you may want to go 
into them in greater depth another time. 
First of all, the lack of insurance of defendants makes it 
somewhat tricky for lawyers to take on cases. They may have 
insurance, but if it is an intentional tort their insurance won’t 
cover them. New York State, for example, doesn’t allow 
insurance contracts to be written that cover intentional torts, and 
this is true for a vast majority of states. So there you have simply 
a system of judgment-proof defendants. One famous defendant 
who may or may not be judgment-proof is O.J. Simpson. He was 
sued and actually lost a tort action against him for wrongful 
death. I suspect that the plaintiffs will eventually—if they have 
not already—locate personal assets to recover. But you can 
imagine that it is a very tricky proposition to structure tort law as 
a response to violence between domestic partners when insurance 
is a problem. 
Secondly, and this is an interesting way in which one can 
frame the teaching of a torts class. It happened to me this 
morning. I realized, as I was teaching a statute of limitations 
case, that I could teach it from this perspective. But statute of 
limitations is in fact a tricky problem when you’re talking about 
intentional torts. The short statute of limitations makes it hard for 
people to bring claims, especially when they are afraid of 
retaliation if they’re intending to pursue divorce later on or if 
they’re intending to try and extricate themselves, given that there 
may be children in common or property in common. So the short 
statute of limitations makes suing for intentional torts very, very 
difficult, which is why you don’t see very many claims. There 
are also some very interesting cases on the question of continuing 
torts, as well as on the question of equitable tolling. But the law 
does not look very good. 
Finally, the law of damages itself presents an interesting 
problem about how to measure and how to award damages. 
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Naturally, you’d think that this would be a wonderful area where 
punitive damages would be a great way for torts practitioners to 
use the skills that they have. But what we can talk about later is 
why juries are not necessarily sympathetic in the framing of 
punitive damages in cases including intentional torts against 
women as they might be in other contexts. 
I think that’s where I’m going to end it now, because what I’d 
like to hear more about is how these problems get played out in a 
variety of contexts, including the context of divorce, because I 
think that’s really one of the biggest problems. Thank you. 
 
Betty Levinson 
It is a pleasure to be with you. As I begin our discussion 
about tort and other civil remedies for victims of domestic 
violence, I want to first connect with Lisa’s reference to criminal 
court allocutions.65 As I listened to her comments, I thought back 
to 1973, my last semester here at Brooklyn. Parenthetically, 
Nancy Erickson, whose work has been acknowledged by Stacy 
Caplow,66 and I were in the same section. I am glad that we are 
all here together today. 
During that semester I was a member of the first class of 
students permitted to appear in criminal court under the aegis of 
the Legal Aid Society, as it implemented the new “student 
practice” rules.67 We worked down the block on Schermerhorn 
Street, standing up for real clients in the arraignment part. Each 
time an assault case came in, the judge demanded to know the 
whereabouts of the complainant. If the assault was of the 
domestic variety, he would ask, “Where’s the wife?” or 
“Where’s the girlfriend?” and the case would invariably be 
                                                          
65 See presentation of Professor Lisa Smith, supra pp. 430-44. 
66 See presentation of Professor Stacy Caplow, supra pp. 418-30. 
67 N.Y. JUD. LAW § 478 (McKinney 2002) (allowing students to practice 
a limited amount of law and perform all of the essential lawyering functions in 
the jurisdictions including meeting with clients and witnesses to gather facts, 
analyzing legal problems and providing legal advice, negotiating matters on 
behalf of clients with opposing parties and representing clients before courts 
and administrative tribunals under faculty supervision). 
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dismissed as a mere “domestic dispute.”68 If the case involved 
strangers, the question was, “Where’s the victim?” This was 
followed with inquiries regarding the severity of the injuries to 
determine if the offense was a misdemeanor or felony. 
In the years since then, awareness about the nature and 
impact of domestic violence has grown.69 We have ads in the 
subway and public service messages in magazines and 
newspapers. Daytime TV is filled with domestic violence on talk 
shows, not to mention the soaps. Many people have become 
more thoughtful about this problem and no longer automatically 
go into victim-blaming gear.70 We better understand the shame 
and fear that make it so difficult for a domestic violence victim to 
be public about her painful private life.71 We observe the 
                                                          
68 Other commentators have noted this phenomena. See, e.g., ELIZABETH 
M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN & FEMINIST LAWMAKING 104–06 (2000) 
[hereinafter SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN] (suggesting that the domestic 
violence victim’s stories are often marginalized in the courtroom). 
69 For example, approximately 5 percent of employers have established 
policies pertaining to domestic violence. See Cycles of Silence: More 
Employers Today Are Doing Their Part to Help Employees in Abusive 
Relationships, CINCINNATI POST, June 4, 2002, at 1B (“For years, employers 
considered domestic violence a private matter, an issue best kept behind closed 
doors . . . . [Today] [a]bout 5 percent have policies that specifically address 
domestic violence”). In addition, some police departments have procedures for 
responding to domestic violence calls that allow officers to arrest the offender 
if someone has been beaten regardless of whether the victim decides to press 
charges. See presentation of Professor Lisa Smith, supra pp. 430-44 
(discussing changes in processing and prosecuting domestic violence cases in 
New York City). 
70 In fact, Battered Women’s Syndrome (BWS) is generally admissible as 
part of a self-defense claim when a woman is charged with murder. See, e.g., 
People v. Seeley, 720 N.Y.S.2d 315 (Sup. Ct. 2000) (stating that BWS is not 
a complete defense but is evidence of the defendant’s state of mind relevant to 
a legally accepted defense, such as justification, and holding that a woman on 
trial for the second degree murder of her boyfriend could submit expert 
testimony related to her condition as a battered woman); People v. Garcia, 1 
P.3d 214 (Colo. Ct. App. 1999) (finding evidence of BWS admissible as to the 
general validity of a self defense claim; such evidence goes toward 
establishing whether, from the defendant’s viewpoint, she was justified in 
using deadly force). 
71 This difficulty has been noted elsewhere. For example in the process of 
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powerful draw of the abusive partner, as well as the nature of the 
emotional harms that inevitably accompany physical injuries. 
Despite this progress, we are still challenged by the need to truly 
bring this knowledge home—not just to the trenches where we 
lawyers work—but beyond, to the policy makers, and ultimately 
to our legislators, who create the standards for civil behavior and 
the remedies for their breach. We still have a lot of work to do. 
Over the years, virtually every person I have worked with 
who has been a victim and then a survivor of domestic violence 
has been clear: the permanent injuries of most domestic violence 
are not physical, they are emotional.72 They are the psychic, 
long-lasting pains of betrayal by somebody you had every reason 
and right to trust. Abuse by a trusted person—a domestic partner, 
a parent, a teacher, a psychotherapist, a clergy person—should 
not be treated as a garden variety tort, as the current crisis in the 
Catholic Church prompts us to remember. The power of the 
intimate abuser over his victim carries with it an imperative of 
silence. When the nature of the wrong makes such silence 
foreseeable, laws requiring prompt action remove any possibility 
of redress. Even sympathetic judges can do no more than point to 
the legislature for hope of reform, as has been demonstrated in 
the case law of childhood sexual abuse.73 
                                                          
construction and location of a $3 million women’s shelter in Milwaukee 
Wisconsin, the center and its staff expressed hope that “shedding the secrecy 
of [the building’s] location will increase awareness of domestic violence” and 
eliminate the privacy of the abuse. Ana Caban, Public Appeal Begins For 
Shelter, MILWAUKEE JOURNAL SENTINEL, Feb. 5, 2002, at 3B. “Privacy was 
once closely guarded as a way of preventing more violence against women and 
children. Becoming public, however, is a way of holding the perpetrator more 
accountable, . . . and a way of telling the community, ‘[l]et’s all help to solve 
this problem’ of domestic violence.” Id. 
72 Cf. Mary Ann Dutton, Understanding Women’s Responses to Domestic 
Violence: A Redefinition of Battered Woman Syndrome, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
1191, 1216-19 (1993) (noting that the psychological impact of domestic 
violence and abuse reaches beyond depression, anxiety, or nightmares, and 
that “[p]sychological reactions to violence also include the ways in which 
battered women have come to think about the violence, themselves, and others 
as a result of their experiences.”). 
73 For example, one opinion noted that “[i]t may be that special 
legislation is necessary to protect the civil rights of the defenseless victims.” 
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Our procedural and substantive laws on the civil side do not 
provide a welcome mat to domestic violence victims.74 Given the 
fact that the vast majority of domestic assaults are charged as 
misdemeanors or violations, tort claims pleading significant 
emotional injuries are legally hobbled when not accompanied by 
serious physical injuries. In addition, tort attorneys, paid on 
contingency fee agreements, are generally unwilling to litigate 
cases without the promise of a substantial recovery, which, at 
present, goes hand-in-hand only with such physical injuries. 
In the absence of state law that would presumptively permit 
domestic violence victims to obtain meaningful financial 
compensation for their psychological as well as physical injuries, 
civil remedies, either in the tort sphere or within the matrimonial 
law context, however, turn a cold shoulder toward domestic 
violence victims. In New York, courts have been unfriendly to 
both married and single women seeking tort remedies for the 
psychological injuries sustained because of domestic violence.75 
The court of appeals ruled out any cause of action for damages 
for the intentional infliction of emotional distress between 
married people,76 a rule of law that continues to disallow such 
claims until the present time.77 The same result applies to 
                                                          
Hoffman v. Hoffman, No. 30040/87 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 8, 1988) aff’d, 162 
A.D.2d 249 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990). 
74 Statutes of limitations present the most obvious example. See, e.g., 
Wriggins, supra note 63, at 139-40 (noting the relatively short statutes of 
limitations for intentional torts compared to negligence and strict liability, and 
how the dynamics of domestic violence can make filing a tort claim near the 
time the injuries are sustained difficult if not impossible). 
75 See, e.g., Weiker v. Weiker, 290 N.Y.S.2d 732, 734 (1986) (stating 
that recovery for intentional infliction of emotional distress should not apply to 
marital disputes); Murphy v. Murphy, 486 N.Y.S.2d 457, 459 (App. Div. 
1985) (reducing an award for intentional infliction of emotional distress to an 
ex-girlfriend because there was no evidence that her injuries were permanent). 
76 Weiker, 290 N.Y.S.2d at 734 (finding that allowing recovery for 
intentional infliction of mental distress in disputes arising out of matrimonial 
differences would “result in the revival of evils which prompted the 
Legislature in 1935 to outlaw actions for alienation of affections and criminal 
conversation”). 
77 See, e.g., Reich v. Reich, 657 N.Y.S.2d 671, 672 (App. Div. 1997) 
(holding that a claim for the intentional infliction of emotional distress between 
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unmarried co-habitants.78 
Furthermore, in the tort arena, the statute of limitations for 
assault and other intentional torts is typically very short.79 In New 
York, it is just one year.80 It often takes a battered woman 
numerous attempts to permanently break away from an abusive 
partner. A domestic violence survivor is likely to be emotionally 
bound to her abuser even after physical separation.81 Thus, the 
expectation that she should be in a position to sue within one year 
is unrealistic. Here, I can’t help but observe that the statute of 
limitations for breach of contract in New York is six years,82 
which speaks volumes about our legislature’s priorities. 
One recently achieved exception to New York’s one-year 
statute of limitations arises if an adult domestic violence victim 
                                                          
spouses is not actionable). 
78 See Williams v. Lynch, 666 N.Y.S.2d 749, 750 (App. Div. 1997) 
(holding that plaintiff could not maintain an action for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress where her “allegation was not atypical in a matrimonial 
dispute and did not rise to the level of atrocity or outrageousness to sustain 
such a claim.”); Artache v. Golden, 133 A.D.2d 596 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987) 
(holding that there was no cause of action for intentional infliction of emotion 
distress in New York arising out of an oral partnership agreement by the 
parties who cohabitate and hold themselves out to be husband and wife); 
Baron v. Jeffer, 469 N.Y.S.2d 815 (App. Div. 1983) (finding that it would be 
contrary to public policy to recognize recovery for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress in the context of a “dispute arising out of the differences” 
occurring between persons who, although not married, have been living 
together as husband and wife for an extended period of time). 
79 For example, California, Texas and New Jersey have a two year statute 
of limitations for intentional torts. CAL. CIV. PROC. § 335.1 (2003); TEX. 
CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 16.003(a) (2003); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 14-2 (West 
2003). 
80 N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 215(3) (McKinney 2003). 
81 See, e.g., Barriers to Leaving a Violent Relationship, National 
Coalition Against Domestic Violence, at http://www.ncadv.org/problem/ 
barriers.htm (last visited Mar. 4, 2003) (detailing the reasons why women stay 
in violent relationships as well as why they may feel emotionally bound to 
their abusers). During non-violent phases, a victim can view her abuser as a 
“good man” who fulfills her dreams of romantic love. Id. 
82 N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 213(2) (McKinney 2003) (stating that an action upon 
a contractual obligation or liability, express or implied, must be commenced 
within six years). 
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can show that her injuries—physical, emotional, or economic—
were so severe as to render her incapable of functioning in 
society.83 The decision in the case, Nussbaum v. Steinberg,84 on 
which I served as plaintiff’s attorney and Liz Schneider acted as 
counsel for amicus curiae, contains language that vividly 
describes the intensity of a battered victim’s connection to her 
abuser.85 I am glad to say that the domestic violence survivor 
whose efforts to effectuate this precedent, Hedda Nussbaum, is 
with us today. 
In the Nussbaum case, it was the physical element of the tort 
that provided the basis for damages, as opposed to the emotional 
injuries.86 Again, emotional pain and suffering, to be 
compensable, requires a physical injury. Psychological injuries 
alone constitute second-class damages, as illustrated in Roy v. 
Hartogs, where an emotionally ill patient became the sexual prey 
of her psychiatrist.87 Although a jury awarded significant 
                                                          
83 Nussbaum v. Steinberg, 703 N.Y.S.2d 32, 33 (App. Div. 2000). 
84 Id. at 33. See also Court Decisions, First Judicial Department, New 
York Part [hereinafter, Court Decisions], N.Y. L.J., Mar. 12, 1997, at 26, 
col. 3 (reproducing the opinion of special referee Liebman that allowed tolling 
of the statute of limitations for insanity in a domestic violence case where the 
victim was so overpowered by her abuser that she became unable to 
independently function in society and protect her legal rights). 
85 Court Decisions, supra note 84. Stating that in cases of domestic 
violence: 
the abuser and the victim are generally found to be in a close or 
intimate relationship. The destructive impact of violence in such an 
intimate relationship may be so complete that the victim is rendered 
incapable of independent judgment even to save one’s own life. In 
various forms, the victim may very well turn to the tormentor for 
connection and support. 
Id. 
86 Id. (stating that “[a] factual demonstration on the record of physical, 
emotional and even economic abuse can serve as an evidentiary basis for 
demonstrating that one is incapable of pursuing their legal rights” and entitled 
to an extension of the one-year statute of limitations in New York). 
87 381 N.Y.S.2d 587, 588 (App. Div. 1976) (holding that a plaintiff who 
claimed that her psychiatrist had sexual intercourse with her for thirteen 
months as part of her therapy could sustain a cause of action for malpractice). 
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damages, the appellate division drastically reduced the award.88 
Remedies for domestic violence occurring within the 
marriage relationship have been equally unavailing. When we 
think about the intersection of domestic violence and divorce, we 
remember our family law courses, and history in which women 
were the property of husbands and subject to his “chastisement,” 
provided a wife was beaten by a stick no thicker than his 
thumb.89 For centuries, the notion of a wife suing her husband for 
exercising his rights was legally without merit.90 Gradually, over 
time, legal impediments for women were lifted with the 
introduction of the Married Women’s Acts91 and the repeal of 
interspousal immunity in many jurisdictions. 
Faced with procedural and substantive impediments to 
obtaining damages, attorneys have sought alternative theories by 
which to obtain appropriate compensation for clients, such as 
negligence and fraud, which was the basis for recovery in 
Maharam v. Maharam.92 The defendant husband in Maharam 
was liable for failing to inform his wife that he had contracted 
                                                          
88 Id. at 589. The appellate court modified the jury award of $153,697.50 
in compensatory and punitive damages, holding that compensatory damages 
greater than $25,000 were excessive and that the plaintiff could not recover 
punitive damages. Id. 
89 For discussions of the historical treatment of abused wives in the law, 
see generally Ray Thomas, History Has Been Brutal for Women, 62 TEX. B.J. 
903 (1999); Hazel D. Lord, Husband and Wife: English Marriage Law From 
1750: A Bibliographic Essay, 11 S. CAL. Rev. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 1 
(2001). 
90 See, e.g., Michael A. Buda & Teresa L. Butler, The Battered Wife 
Syndrome: A Backdoor Assault on Domestic Violence, 23 J. FAM. L. 359, 
340-41 (1984) (stating that the “perception of the marital relationship gave 
husbands the legal right to beat their wives because married women were 
considered ‘nonpersons,’ they enjoyed virtually no rights—not even the right 
to be free from physical beatings.”). 
91 See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 3-313 (West 2001) (providing a 
married woman with a right of action for an injury to her person, property or 
character, or for an injury arising out of the marital relation, as if unmarried). 
92 575 N.Y.S.2d 846, 847 (App. Div. 1991). Wife sought monetary 
damages as a result of husband allegedly transmitting venereal disease to her. 
Id. 
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herpes.93 However, it was by the plaintiff’s reliance upon an 
imperative in the Public Health Law, rather than any law or 
attitude recognizing the nature of domestic violence, that 
permitted her to sue for money damages.94 
Some attorneys have turned to the matrimonial sphere to 
pursue economic recognition of physical and emotional injuries 
sustained by domestic violence victims. In New York, the 
divorce cause of action under which a wife must sue is “cruel 
and inhuman treatment,” which requires a showing that the 
defendant has engaged in conduct that “so endangers the physical 
or mental well being of the plaintiff as renders it unsafe or 
improper for the plaintiff to co-habit with the defendant.”95 
However, the level of cruel and inhuman treatment that may be 
actionable in a short marriage will not suffice in a marriage of 
long duration,96 increasing the burden of proof for a domestic 
violence victim in a longer marriage. To compound this problem, 
there is a five-year statute of limitations for cruel and inhuman 
treatment.97 A wife who remains with—or even separates from—
an abusive husband and does not bring an action within five years 
cannot obtain a divorce on cruelty grounds.98 Again, the current 
                                                          
93 Maharam v. Maharam, 510 N.Y.S.2d 104 (App. Div. 1986). The 
appellate court ruled that the husband had an affirmative legal duty to disclose 
that he had genital herpes to his wife based on a section of the Public Health 
Law which provided that “any person who, knowing himself or herself to be 
infected with an infectious venereal disease, has sexual intercourse with 
another shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.” Id. at 107. See also N.Y. PUB. 
HEALTH LAW § 2307 (McKinney 2003). 
94 Maharam, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 107 (noting that the wife alleged that the 
husband was grossly negligent in failing to disclose the fact that he had genital 
herpes, which was the proximate cause of her injury). The court found that 
“[t]his states a legally cognizable claim inasmuch as the husband’s alleged 
conduct violates section 2307, a statute enacted for public health and safety, 
and may therefore be negligent per se.” Id. 
95 See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 170(1) (Consol. 2003). 
96 See, e.g., Hessen v. Hessen, 353 N.Y.2d 421, 426-27 (1974) (holding 
that the level of cruel and inhuman treatment that must be established in a 
divorce proceeding increases with the duration of the marriage). 
97 N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 210 (Consol. 2003). 
98 Id. 
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statutes ignore the many reasons why an abused wife may not be 
able to bring an action within the requisite time, thus preventing 
her from obtaining a judgment of divorce, or, as likely, forcing 
her to accept undesirable settlement terms. Moreover, the 
standard settlement agreement contains a general release that 
waives any right to sue on any cause of action occurring prior to 
the execution of the agreement. 
New York divorce law has never contemplated the explicit 
granting of financial compensation to an abused spouse. Before 
1980, title controlled the distribution of property—most typically 
to the husband—and alimony was available to a dependent 
spouse. However, no matter how badly abused the wife was, if 
she was guilty of marital misconduct, her right to alimony was 
extinguished.99 
In 1980, New York’s Equitable Distribution Law became 
effective, creating a new genus of marital property. However, the 
statute is facially blind to fault and in the twenty or more years 
since its effective date, only a handful of cases have weighted the 
distribution of property in a fashion that recognizes the impact of 
egregious behavior by an abusive spouse.100 I believe Kristin will 
talk about one such recent case, Johnston v. Martin, 101 handled 
by her office. 
The result of our statutory framework is that if a stranger 
strikes me and does me significant physical and/or emotional 
injury, I can sue him for my medical expenses, my pain and 
suffering, as well as punitive damages. If my husband assaults 
me, however, my principal remedy is divorce, under the “cruel 
                                                          
99 See generally David Kaufman, Note, The New York Equitable 
Distribution Statute: An Update, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 845 (1987) (explaining 
that prior to the passage of section 236 of the New York Domestic Relations 
Law, New York courts were required to award property upon divorce to the 
spouse that held title to the property, often resulting in the husband being 
awarded the property). 
100 Havell v. Islam, 751 N.Y.S.2d 449, 452 (App. Div. 2002) (citing the 
trial court’s finding that the husband’s behavior was “so egregious as to ‘shock 
the conscience’ and relied on its equitable powers to render justice between the 
parties.”). 
101 See presentation of Kristin Bebelaar, infra pp. 460-73. 
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and inhuman treatment” provisions of the Domestic Relations 
Law,102 and I have no right to compensation above and beyond 
my “equitable share” of the marital estate, and perhaps a claim 
for spousal maintenance—particularly if I have been so badly 
injured I am unable to work.103 If there is no marital estate at the 
time of the divorce judgment, and if my husband currently has no 
significant income, I’m out of luck. 
While the result in Johnston is correct, it does not grapple 
with the underlying problem—that is, current remedies do not 
presumptively entitle an abused spouse to compensation for the 
physical and emotional injuries suffered during marriage either 
by way of a larger share of the marital estate or payment in the 
nature of damages.104 In addition, the financial circumstances of 
the family at the time of judgment are those upon which the court 
                                                          
102 See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 170(1) (Consol. 2003). Providing that 
“[t]he cruel and inhuman treatment of the plaintiff by the defendant such that 
the conduct of the defendant so endangers the physical or mental well being of 
the plaintiff as renders it unsafe or improper for the plaintiff to cohabit with 
the defendant.” Id. 
103 A court may award maintenance “in such amount as justice requires.” 
N.Y. DOM. REL. § 236, Part B, (6)(a) (Consol. 2003). In determining the 
amount of maintenance to award, courts consider a variety of factors, 
including the parties’ health and earning capacities and the ability of the party 
seeking maintenance to become self-supporting. N.Y. DOM. REL. § 236, Part 
B, (6)(a)(2)-(4) (Consol. 2003). The statute also allows a maintenance award 
for “any other factor which the court shall expressly find to be just and 
proper. N.Y. DOM. REL. § 236, Part B, (6)(a)(11) (Consol. 2003). 
104 See generally Dalton, supra note 62, at 387. The author states: 
If an abused spouse cannot commence a tort action subsequent to a 
divorce, the spouse will be forced to elect between three equally 
unacceptable alternatives: (1) Commence a tort action during the 
marriage and possibly endure additional abuse; (2) join a tort claim in 
a divorce action and waive the right to a jury trial on the tort claim; 
or (3) commence an action to terminate the marriage, forego the tort 
claim, and surrender the right to recover damages arising from 
spousal abuse. To enforce such an election would require an abused 
spouse to surrender both the constitutional right to a jury trial and 
valuable property rights to preserve his or her well-being. This the 
law will not do. 
Id. 
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must make its determination, without reference to the abuser 
spouse’s separate property. This excludes from judicial 
consideration the possibility that the abuser may have secreted 
assets and income or that he may vastly improve his financial 
standing after the entry of judgment. If an award were made 
without reference to the family’s present economics, a judgment 
for such damages would function like any money judgment under 
New York state law, that is, it would be effective for a period of 
twenty years.105 
Another area where domestic violence and tort law may 
intersect is on issues regarding the liability of a third party. For 
example, is a police department that is aware of an order of 
protection but fails to take action to enforce it liable for money 
damages? In Connecticut, the answer is yes.106 In New York, 
unless the plaintiff victim can show a “special relationship” to 
obtain a finding of police negligence, she has no remedy.107 In 
addition, even if there is an actionable claim, the police 
department will implead the abuser, thus, substantially reducing 
its share of damages. 
As we make efforts to further modify our laws to provide 
remedies for victims of domestic violence, we should be mindful 
of what Candace mentioned about having our antennae sensitized 
to picking up issues of domestic violence.108 In many spheres, not 
necessarily those that immediately announce themselves, 
domestic violence is just beneath the surface. For example, the 
client who comes for help regarding a real estate dispute with her 
former lover may not feel comfortable speaking about the 
                                                          
105 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 211(a) (McKinney 2003). 
106 See, e.g., Thurman v. Torrington, 595 F.Supp. 1521 (D. Conn. 1984) 
(finding a cognizable cause of action under the Equal Protection Clause where 
the police afforded more protection to those who were abused by non-relatives 
but did not devote the same level of attention and care when the abuser was 
the spouse or relative of the victim). 
107 See, e.g., Sorichetti v. New York, 65 N.Y.2d 461 (1985) (holding the 
police department liable for negligence only when a special relationship exists 
between the city and the infant because of an order of protection). 
108 See presentation of Candace Sady, supra pp. 414-15. 
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intimate details of their abusive relationship.109 However, the 
outcome may turn on the fact that there have been allegations of 
domestic violence. By way of another example, the fact that a 
client is afraid of her life partner may influence the manner in 
which a will is drafted.110 
As practitioners, we need to elicit all facts that will enable us 
to properly counsel our clients, even in cases where domestic 
violence may not seem to have any role in the problem the client 
has presented to us. Unless we can make our clients comfortable 
enough to trust us with such information, we may be missing a 
big piece of the picture. 
In conclusion, we need to keep focused on all levels of 
concern. The legislature should be persuaded to bring current tort 
law into the modern era by making it accessible to victims of 
domestic violence who would otherwise be foreclosed by short 
statutes of limitation. Trial and appellate courts should be 
encouraged to recognize the depth of the psychological injuries 
suffered by victims of domestic abuse. Furthermore, attorneys 
should be attuned to the unspoken in order to permit injured 
clients to feel comfortable enough to describe what is, for most 
people, unspeakable.111 
                                                          
109 See Andrea D. Lyon, Be Careful What You Wish for: An Examination 
of Arrest and Prosecution Patterns of Domestic Violence in Cases in Two 
Cities in Michigan, 5 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 253 (1999) (discussing generally 
that victims of domestic violence are reluctant to report abuse and pursue 
criminal action for fear of inciting more abuse from their abuser). 
110 A victim’s fear of her abuser may intersect with her anxiety about 
being able to obtain assistance from the judicial system. See Betty Levinson, 
Handling the Domestic Violence Case 2000, 82 PLI/NY 11, 20 (2000). 
Therefore, attorneys must be sensitive to their clients’ doubts and fears and 
may have to adjust settlement or trial strategies in response. Id. at 21. 
Attorneys must maintain professional competence and the zealous 
representation of their clients, which requires awareness of all relevant aspects 
of law that could impact the handling of any particular issue in domestic 
violence cases. Id. at 23. 
111 The difficulties of open communication between abused clients and 
their legal counsel have also been noted elsewhere. See, e.g., Bruce J. 
Winick, Client Denial and Resistance in the Advance Directive Context: 
Reflections on How Attorneys Can Identify and Deal with a Psycholegal Soft 
Spot, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 901, 907 (1998) (noting that when a client 
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Kristin Bebelaar 
I have to say at the outset that I am honored and frankly, a 
little nervous to be on this panel. I’ve been practicing law for 
about six years and it’s hard for me to believe that I’m on a panel 
with the people who taught me much of what I know. I took 
Professor Rosato’s Family Law class. I took Professor 
Schneider’s Women and the Law class and I was a research and 
teaching assistant in her course on Battered Women and the Law. 
I took Professor Sebok’s Jurisprudence class. I worked on an 
amicus brief in a battered woman’s tort case with Ms. Levinson 
when I was a law student. I have worked on a case opposite 
Patricia Fersch, who’s going to talk about family law practice, 
and I have long respected her practice as an attorney. So I’m a 
little intimidated but I am very honored to be here. I’m glad that 
Professor Thomas spoke about the issues of mutual assent and 
duress,112 because I think those issues are important aspects of 
contracts law in the context of battering, but I’m not going to 
have time to talk about them today. 
Professor Schneider has written extensively on battering and 
the law.113 As her work makes clear, battering is a major social 
                                                          
is unwilling to engage in an open discussion, the attorney should observe the 
client for signs of agitation, anger, and distress and be sensitive to the client’s 
anxiety level and proceed gently). 
112 The remarks of Professor Chantal Thomas are not reproduced here. 
113 Professor Schneider has authored or co-authored many articles and 
books on the subject of domestic violence and women’s rights. See, e.g., 
DALTON & SCHNEIDER, supra note 4; SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN, supra 
note 69; Cynthia G. Bowman & Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Legal 
Profession: the Impact of Law and Legal Theory: Feminist Legal Theory, 
Feminist Lawmaking, and the Legal Profession, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 249 
(1998); Elizabeth M. Schneider, Resistance to Equality, 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 
477 (1996); Elizabeth M. Schneider, Particularity and Generality: Challenges 
of Feminist Theory and Practice in Work on Woman-Abuse, 67 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 520, 522 (1992) [hereinafter Schneider, Particularity and Generality]; 
Elizabeth M. Schneider, Describing and Changing: Women’s Self-Defense 
Work and the Problem of Expert Testimony on Battering, 14 WOMEN’S RTS. 
L. REP. 263 (1992); Elizabeth M. Schneider, Equal Rights to Trial for 
Women: Sex Bias in the Law of Self-Defense, 15 HARV. C.R.-C.L L. REV. 
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problem, as well as a touchstone of feminist theory and activism. 
Therefore, battering is an excellent subject in which to teach 
students two things every practicing attorney comes to know. 
First, it is the rare case that fits precisely into only one area of 
law, which is why a good lawyer must be familiar with all areas 
of law.114 Second, in every case, there is both a “specific 
picture,” the facts as your client initially presents them to you, 
and a “big picture,” the story the court will recognize as fitting 
into a particular area or areas of law.115 Inevitably, your client’s 
story is more complex than the set of facts and legal concepts a 
court wants to hear about. However, as your client’s attorney, 
you must address both the issues that are significant to your client 
and the ones that will be significant to the court.116 
Domestic violence is an excellent vehicle to teach these two 
concepts because domestic violence comes up in the facts, and 
thus, has legal effects on cases in virtually every legal category. 
Additionally, cases involving clients who have experienced 
violence in a relationship usually involve the kind of complexity 
that requires lawyers and law students to focus on both the 
“specific picture” and the “big picture.” 
                                                          
623, 632 (1980). 
114 See, e.g., Meier, supra note 29, at 1296 (noting that practicing 
domestic violence law requires some degree of knowledge in other disciplines, 
including but not limited to psychology, sociology, public policy, and criminal 
law). 
115 See Schneider, Particularity and Generality, supra note 113, at 567 
(acknowledging the difficulty with accurately describing the experiences of 
battered women and in conveying this understanding to the courts). “Although 
the battered women’s movement has had to demonstrate distinctive aspects of 
the problem of battering in order to establish battered women as a legal and 
social construct, the characterizations of distinctiveness have been incomplete, 
have not explained fully the complex experiences of battering, and have 
constrained feminist analysis.” Id. 
116 See, e.g., Dorchen A. Leidholdt, Interviewing Battered Women, in 
LAWYER’S MANUAL ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: REPRESENTING THE VICTIM 
115, 127-29 (Ronald E. Cohen & James C. Neely ed., 2d ed. 1998) 
[hereinafter LAWYER’S MANUAL] (discussing the various issues victims of 
domestic violence face in addition to the legal proceeding their lawyer was 
retained to handle, such as the client’s personal safety concerns, and 
psychological needs). 
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I should preface my comments on the specific case I will 
discuss today by saying that it is perhaps misleading to say that I 
am a “contracts practitioner.” I am a general civil practitioner. I 
approach every case, whether it is presented to me as primarily a 
torts case or a family law case or a discrimination case or a 
contracts case, holistically, as I think most lawyers do—at least 
that’s what my professors at Brooklyn Law School taught me. I 
separate out different legal issues from one another and most 
cases fall primarily into one category or another, but I also need 
to understand how the different legal aspects of a particular case 
affect each other.117 
The case I will focus on in my comments today is a 
“contracts” case in the sense that it involves drafting and 
executing a contract, but the contract has to do with the sale of 
real property. Therefore, in order to properly draft it, I had to 
utilize property law principles because it was a contract between 
people with a history of relationship violence. I also had to utilize 
what some would characterize as family law principles, as well 
as criminal law principles, in advising my client and in drafting 
the contract. Similarly, in this, as in every case, I had to 
understand how the facts a client brings me fit into various legal 
categories and rules. To do that, I have to start by really listening 
to my client. 
Working with a client who has been abused involves some 
skills I think most people don’t learn in law school: the skill of 
listening.118 Listening not just to the words your client is saying, 
but to her body language and the words left unsaid.119 Some of 
                                                          
117 Similar client interviewing and counseling techniques have been 
explored elsewhere. See, e.g., ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR., ET AL., THE 
COUNSELOR-AT-LAW: A COLLABORATIVE APPROACH TO CLIENT 
INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING 12-16 (1999) (stating that lawyers often 
control the direction of their client’s case by fitting the situation into areas of 
law with which they are more comfortable and that lawyers also serve as 
gatekeepers to the legal system by screening out issues that may not have legal 
bases). 
118 See generally SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN, supra note 69 
(discussing the complexities of understanding and evaluating a battered 
woman’s needs). 
119 Id. See also Meier, supra note 29, at 1334-35 (noting that an attorney 
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this is perhaps something that can’t be taught in three years of 
law school. I learned it largely by working with people in the 
process of freeing themselves from abuse. Coming to understand 
that process entailed understanding that while there are elements 
of the process that are common, each person’s process is also 
different. 
Professor Schneider refers to this as the “complexities of 
voice.”120 She points out that practitioners must understand that 
battered women have both a different voice as a group and 
different voices as individuals.121 She writes about the importance 
of understanding the interplay between what she calls 
“particularity and generality.”122 In other words, there are 
experiences and themes that are common to every abused 
person’s story, yet each person’s particular life experience will 
inform her experience of abuse and how she communicates—or 
doesn’t communicate—that experience.123 
                                                          
should encourage communication by developing an understanding with his or 
her client which would entail knowing the client’s feelings by being able to 
identify “nonverbal cues” such as body language). 
120 SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN, supra note 69, at 62-73 (discussing 
that the term battered woman does not capture the range of abuse, in terms of 
circumstances or type, that face women and there is a need to understand the 
variety of contexts in which abuse occurs in order to appropriately address the 
issues in a legal forum). 
121 Id. at 62 (asserting that effective counseling, as well as legal assistance 
for a “battered woman” must take into consideration not only the needs of the 
individual case but also consider pressures asserted on the victim by her 
community that may make her reluctant to report the abuse or pursue 
prosecution of the abuser). 
122 Schneider, Particularity and Generality, supra note 113, at 522. 
Professor Schneider argues that lawyers must take into account the particular 
experiences of abused women as well as the general violence against women in 
society. Id. She defines “particularity” as “describing the complexity of 
women’s experiences non-simplistically, accurately, and in greater detail.” Id. 
She divides the general problems of violence against women into two 
categories: “the way in which woman-abuse must be viewed as linked to 
larger societal violence” and the way it is “linked to women’s subordination in 
general.” Id. See also SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN, supra note 69, at 59, 
71. 
123 See SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN, supra note 69, at 59, 71. 
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Second, as Professor Schneider writes, lawyers need to 
understand that battered women are often heard, yet not really 
heard—and for many women, this experience affects the way 
they tell their story.124 In other words, within the relationship they 
are often repeatedly “gaslighted,” or convinced that their 
experience is not reality, that they are “crazy.”125 When they try 
to tell others about the abuse, they are often not listened to or not 
believed or are asked what they did to deserve or cause the 
abuse, implying that it must be their fault. They learn to be 
hesitant about telling their story or not to tell it at all. They often 
feel a great deal of shame about the abuse, in part because their 
abusers often convince them it is their fault or that they deserved 
it. 
I think battered women may be more hesitant to discuss the 
abuse today than they have ever been, because women are 
expected to be strong and autonomous in ways they weren’t ten 
or twenty years ago. Today, there are women whose strength and 
self-sufficiency in their work lives makes it much harder for them 
to admit to abuse at home. Certainly the average woman I deal 
with in my practice is in her thirties to fifties, well-educated, 
usually lives in Manhattan, has a successful career, and on the 
surface seems independent and self-confident, yet I encounter 
                                                          
124 Schneider, Particularity and Generality, supra note 113, at 558. 
Society typically views battered women as helpless, which puts them at a 
disadvantage in the legal system. Id. In an effort to minimize society’s impact 
on the judicial system, expert testimony on battering was developed to explain 
common experiences and their impact. Id. at 560. In addition “[t]he goal was 
to assist the jury and the court in fairly evaluating the reasonableness of the 
battered woman’s action. The notion of expert testimony was predicated on an 
assumption that battered women’s voices would not be understood or were not 
strong enough to be heard alone in the courtroom.” Id. By focusing on both 
the particular and general aspects of battery, social beliefs of female 
subordination are more easily recognized, and women are allowed to tell their 
individual stories within a general context. Id. at 567-68. 
125 See SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN, supra note 69, at 31 (recognizing 
that because of various societal stereotypes against women who kill, they often 
faced discrimination and inequality at trials); see also Meier, supra note 29, at 
1344 (recognizing that society conveys messages to the victim that her 
experience of domestic violence is trivial, or that her accusations are false, or 
that she is personally responsible for the abuse). 
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clients on virtually a daily basis who have been battered or are 
now being battered.126 
I have learned that abused clients will often only hint at the 
violence or threats of violence they are experiencing, telling only 
the surface of the underlying reality. They often have a depressed 
affect, not showing much emotion even when telling me about a 
traumatic event.127 Some women, including the client whose case 
I will talk about in a moment, even laugh or tell jokes when 
talking about abusive behavior. Sometimes that is another way to 
downplay the seriousness of what they have experienced. 
Sometimes humor is also how they survive it. 
I’m going to call my client Jane. I’ve been working with her 
for about a year. I conducted the initial consultation with a 
partner in my office, Ellen Gesmer. What Jane came to talk to us 
about was a scenario that Ms. Levinson just described when she 
was speaking.128 Jane had purchased an apartment with her then 
boyfriend, whom I will call Bill, and their relationship was 
coming to an end. The apartment was a New York City 
condominium that they had purchased for approximately thirty-
five thousand dollars. In the real estate market at the time Jane 
came to us, the apartment was worth approximately two million 
                                                          
126 For statistics on and profiles of domestic violence see generally 
Domestic Violence Statistics, at http://www.actabuse.com/dvstats_3.html#3 
(last visited Feb. 5, 2002). Midwestern State University conducted a study 
based on a survey of 6,000 women. More than 50 percent of women who said 
they had been abused reported family incomes above $35,000. Id. Just over 70 
percent of the women were Anglo, 10.4 percent were black, and 9.5 percent 
were Hispanic. Id. The women were also asked to provide information on 
education levels and income of the abusers. That profile showed that more 
than 18 percent had a bachelor’s degree or higher. Id. 
127 This is also called “constriction.” See Meier, supra note 29, at 1312-
14 (1993). See also Linda Kelly, Domestic Violence Survivors: Surviving the 
Beatings of 1996, 11 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 303, 318-19 (1997) (stating that a 
domestic violence victim suffering from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder 
(PTSD) may recount stories of horrific violence inflicted upon her without 
emotion). Moreover, “[w]ithout the proper training to recognize such a trait, a 
benefits decision-maker may simply conclude that the battered (victim’s) story 
is false” because they believe that true victims could never suffer such 
violence without evoking emotion. Id. at 319. 
128 See presentation of Betty Levinson, supra pp. 448-59. 
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dollars. She wanted to know what her rights were with regard to 
the property, and if it would be possible to sell the apartment and 
recoup her investment in it even if Bill could not afford to buy 
her out and did not want to sell. 
When Jane initially came to us, she did not present her story 
as being about, or even involving, domestic violence. She told us 
that she and Bill owned the loft as joint tenants with rights of 
survivorship, that they’d been in the relationship for about fifteen 
years, and that they were never legally married. During their 
relationship, she had made a major financial investment in the 
apartment, paying for virtually all of the purchase and renovation 
costs, maintenance, mortgage, insurance, and real estate taxes, 
and had in addition loaned Bill money and paid half the rent on 
his separate work space over the years. 
She talked about him having broken a piece of furniture 
during an argument, and then went on to tell the rest of the story. 
We had to stop her there, because she talked about it as if that 
were no big deal. In fact, I think she even laughed about it. We 
had to ask her a number of questions to get the whole picture. 
What eventually emerged was what I’ve come to recognize as 
a fairly typical picture of an abusive relationship.129 It started 
with a lot of isolation of her support systems—friends and 
family—which then progressed to threats, then the breaking of 
furniture or personal items or throwing and banging objects, then 
throwing things at her, and finally physical assaults on her such 
as grabbing her and shoving her against the walls. The threats 
became more frequent and more intense as time went on. Jane’s 
partner also drank and it seemed that his drinking was getting 
worse. Jane knew that during a rageful episode, he was more 
violent drunk than sober. So, while she was hesitant to tell us this 
                                                          
129 Of course, no two clients or instances of domestic violence are 
identical. There are, however, elements that are considered common, typical 
traits. See Women’s Issues and Social Empowerment, Domestic Violence 
Information Manual: Forms of Domestic Violence, at 
http://www.wise.infoxchange.net.au/dvim/dvabuse.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 
2003) (describing the various types of domestic violence abuse such as 
psychological, emotional, physical, and sexual abuses all of which undermines 
the women’s confidence and isolate her from her support systems). 
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at first, Jane was becoming concerned about her safety, and that 
was really what had brought her to our office. She wanted to 
know if she left the apartment, given the increasing danger to 
her, would she in effect be giving up some or all of her financial 
investment, or whether there were other options. 
We next explored what her feelings were about the whole 
situation. One of the things that I think can be very difficult in 
working with people who have been abused and are still in the 
process of freeing themselves from that abuse is that they often 
don’t know, themselves, what it is they feel or what it is they 
want, because they’re so used to not being allowed to say what 
they feel or want.130 
Other speakers today were talking about using patience. I 
think one of the things that I’ve had to learn to be patient about is 
that each person has his or her own process. As someone’s 
attorney, I can’t advise my client and can’t take the next legal 
step, whether that’s litigation, drafting a letter, or drafting a 
contract, if I don’t know for sure that my client knows what he or 
she wants.131 On the one hand, it is difficult to achieve a balance 
between empowering a client by listening to her and respecting 
her unique process versus confronting any denial she has and 
encouraging her to assess her safety realistically.132 
When we listened to Jane, what emerged was that her 
                                                          
130 Id. (citing Mary Ann Dutton, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder Among 
Battered Women: Analysis of Legal Implications, 12 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 215, 
219 (1994) (stating that “victims of domestic violence suffer psychological 
effects, such as post-traumatic stress disorder or depression,” as well as low 
self-esteem and nervousness as a result of being abused by a loved one)). 
131 Lawyers have a general duty to clarify a client’s wishes before taking 
further steps during the course of representations. See MODEL RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4 (2002). A lawyer is required to “promptly consult 
with and secure the client’s consent prior to taking action unless prior 
discussions with the client have resolved what action the client wants the 
lawyer to take.” Id. 
132 See generally Meier, supra note 29, at 1345, 1347-49 (describing the 
difficulty for a lawyer to adequately assess the danger their client may face 
especially when some victims are unable to assess the danger for themselves as 
a result of the severe abusive treatment they endured causing them to become 
psychologically as well as physically dependent upon their abuser). 
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complex feelings about her experience had a strong effect on her 
ability to make a decision about what she should do.133 She 
wanted to leave, but felt guilty because he had convinced her 
and/or she had convinced herself that she was responsible for his 
feelings. She also knew he would be unhappy about her leaving 
and afraid of what his reaction might be, to what extent she was 
safe, and what leaving might mean for her rights as to the 
apartment.134 
As soon as we realized that there was a continuing physical 
and emotional danger for Jane in staying in her apartment with 
her abuser, we had to address her safety first before we even got 
to the legal issues regarding the apartment. That’s not something 
that I think most of my professors taught me. It’s certainly not 
something I learned in my contracts class, although I had a very 
wonderful contracts professor. Nor was it something I expected 
to deal with in what was essentially a real estate or contract case. 
We had to talk with Jane about a safety plan.135 For example, 
                                                          
133 The psychological response suffered from domestic violence victims 
exposed to prolonged abuse has been termed “learned helplessness.” See 
generally Joan M. Schroeder, Using Battered Women Evidence in the 
Prosecution of a Batterer, 76 IOWA L. REV. 553, 558-59 (1991) (describing 
learned helplessness as the effect of repeated beatings causing a battered 
women to become passive and remain in an abusive situation). 
134 An abused woman’s safety is very often intertwined with her legal 
rights. See generally SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN, supra note 69, at 51-
52, (citing Sally E. Merry, Wife Battering and the Ambiguities of Rights, in 
IDENTITIES, POLITICS, AND RIGHTS 301-02 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. 
Kearns, ed., 1995) (stating that abusers are likely to become more violent 
towards women who leave them and this threat to their safety and the safety of 
their children are of great concern to victims)). 
135 A client’s safety is, of course, of primary concern in situations of 
domestic violence. See Meier, supra note 114, at 1349 (suggesting that if 
danger is imminent, the lawyer should suggest to the client to seek shelter or 
protection). Safe Horizon provides a guide to help abused women make a 
safety plan. See Safe Horizon, Essential Information for Battered Women: 
Making a Safety Plan, at http://www.dvsheltertour.org/safety.html (last 
visited Feb. 5, 2003). The main guidelines and topics are: planning ahead; 
deciding how you would get out; communicating with someone who can help 
and deciding where you should go; keeping important documents together in a 
safe place; memorizing or keeping a list of important telephone numbers; and 
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I suggested putting all of her important documents in one place so 
that if she had to leave suddenly she’d be able to get out quickly. 
I suggested she think of some people she could call on and stay 
with if she needed to leave suddenly. We talked about what the 
police response was likely to be if she called the police.136 We 
spoke to her about other legal options, such as how to get an 
order of protection, which for her would be difficult because she 
was not married or related to her abuser nor did they have a child 
in common.137 This meant that she would need to go to criminal 
court for the order, which, as discussed earlier, can be 
frightening to a lot of women.138 It’s a very different experience 
to get an order of protection in family or supreme court than to 
go to criminal court, where the abuser will have criminal charges 
against him or her.139 
Next, we had to talk about Jane’s options regarding the 
apartment. One option was to try to go to court and seek 
partition, which would mean asking the court to direct that the 
                                                          
keeping your children safe. Id. 
136 See, e.g., Domestic Violence: Guidelines on Police Response 
Procedures in Domestic Violence Cases, at http://www.state.nj.us/lps/dcj/ 
agguide/3dvpolrs.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2003) (stating that some common 
police procedures in domestic violence situations include escorting victims to 
the family part of the superior court, providing the victim with support 
hotlines, and other lifesaving guidance and assistance). 
137 In New York, if the victim is not or has never been legally married to 
the abuser, and does not have a child in common with her abuser, she must go 
to criminal court for an order of protection. See Obtaining and Enforcing 
Valid Orders of Protection in New York State, at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/ 
nyw/victim_witness/pdf/OOPmanual.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2003) (setting 
forth the procedures for obtaining and enforcing orders of protection). 
138 Once a domestic violence proceeding is within the jurisdiction of the 
New York State Criminal Court, the prosecutor has control over the case, not 
the victim, and the prosecutor may chose, but is not obligated, to take the 
victim’s wishes into consideration. Id. at 18. Victims may hesitate to go to 
criminal court because there is a greater threshold of evidence required for the 
criminal court than in family court. Id. 
139 Id. See also N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 530.11(c) (McKinney 2003) (“The 
purpose of Criminal Court is to prosecute the perpetrator for violating a law in 
New York State and can result in a criminal conviction, incarceration, 
probation and/or a criminal fine.”). 
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apartment literally be divided in half, so that she could do what 
she wants with her half and he could do what he wants with his. 
That, of course, would raise issues of whether it was physically 
possible to divide the apartment and what that would do to the 
value of the property. We decided that partition wasn’t a good 
option for her. We also had to research whether, if she left, 
would it affect her right to seek partition. Our research indicated 
that she could leave and it would not affect her rights140—but 
there was still a concern about what he might do to the apartment 
if she left, and how that might affect its value. However, in 
researching partition, I came across one case, Johnston v. 
Martin, which I was surprised to find.141 In that case, a couple 
owned real estate together.142 The man had abused the woman for 
a long time resulting in her leaving the property.143 A few weeks 
after she left, he changed the locks.144 The court found that the 
combination of the abuse with the changed locks constituted 
ouster, which meant that she had the right to use and occupy the 
property and since her abuser had deprived her of this right, she 
could obtain the reasonable value from him for his exclusive use 
of the residence.145 I don’t know if the court would have found 
ouster if he hadn’t changed the locks, but the opinion makes it 
clear that the man’s violence toward her was a factor in the 
court’s determination.146 
                                                          
140 See Perkins v. Volpe, 146 A.D.2d 617 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) 
(holding that the defendant’s exclusive occupancy of a residence did not 
constitute ouster because, as tenants in common, the defendant had the right to 
occupy the whole residence). 
141 183 A.D.2d 1019 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992). 
142 Id. at 1019-20. 
143 Id. 
144 Id. 
145 Id. at 1021. 
146 Id. at 1019, 1021. The court stated: 
[b]ased on the uncontroverted testimony that plaintiff moved out in 
response to her troubled relationship with defendant and his violence 
toward her and that defendant thereafter changed the locks on the 
doors of the big house and informed her of this fact, we are 
persuaded that defendant effectively denied plaintiff access to the 
property. 
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We discussed her offering to buy him out, but she could not 
afford to do so, so this was not a viable option. We discussed the 
possibility of his agreeing that he would buy her out. However, 
every time she had brought either of those options up with him in 
the past, he would become enraged. That was frightening to her. 
In addition, there was a concern that he might file for 
bankruptcy, in which case the apartment would be completely 
lost to her, as the homestead exemption is so low in New 
York.147 So that was not a viable option. 
Another option we discussed with Jane was to go to court and 
ask the court to force a sale. However, the legal standard to 
obtain this relief is “great prejudice.”148 While I thought we 
might be able to argue that it was unsafe for her to remain there, 
and that he could not afford to buy her out, when I did the 
research I could find no cases where a court had found that abuse 
constituted great prejudice. 
Finally, we discussed with Jane the option of negotiating with 
him to agree to sell the apartment to a third party, and then 
divide the profits in such a way that she could recoup her 
investment. Ultimately, we advised her and she agreed that she 
should move out of the apartment as soon as possible and then 
begin the process of negotiating an agreement to sell and divide 
the profits, or, if he wouldn’t agree, to take him to court to seek 
partition or a sale. 
                                                          
Id. at 1019, 1021. 
147 N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5206 (McKinney 2003) (exempting a principal 
homestead up to “ten thousand dollars in above liens and encumbrances . . . 
from application to the satisfaction of a money judgment”). New York’s 
homestead exemption will only protect ten thousand dollars of the value of the 
home above liens and encumbrances. Id. If there is any unencumbered value 
left in the property after the value of the liens, encumbrances, and the 
exemption are accounted for, the home will probably be sold to pay off the 
husband’s unsecured debts. 
148 N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 901(1) (2003). The statute provides: 
[a] person holding and in possession of real property as joint tenant or 
tenant in common, in which he has an estate of inheritance, or for 
life, or for years, may maintain an action for the partition of the 
property, and for a sale if it appears that a partition cannot be made 
without great prejudice to the owners. 
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Then over the next several months, a routine began where 
weeks would go by where I wouldn’t hear from her and I was 
sort of flummoxed. I didn’t know what to do. The partner who 
was supervising me encouraged me and validated for me that it’s 
really my ethical duty to check in with her and make sure she’s 
okay.149 Not only is it a nice thing but it’s really part of my duty 
as her attorney. 
For several months I had to keep checking in with her to see 
if she was okay and to give her some encouragement. It took her 
a long time before she went through her process and was really 
ready to move out and to feel more empowered and more self-
confident. Ultimately, Jane was able to get him to agree that they 
would sell the apartment. 
I have been drafting an agreement setting forth when and how 
they will agree on a sale price, accept an offer, and how they will 
divide profits and expenses at closing. In doing that, even though 
my client is much more self-confident than she was when she 
first came to us, I have to be conscious of the power imbalance 
that is there and her tendency to either let her fears direct her 
decisions or to let herself believe that there is no abuse going 
on.150 
In some cases where the parties to a contract have been in a 
relationship that was abusive, it may be impossible to form and 
execute a viable contract where the power imbalance is too 
great.151 These situations raise interesting issues regarding 
                                                          
149 See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 6-101 (2002). 
(“[a] lawyer shall not . . . neglect a legal matter entrusted to the lawyer.”). 
See also Jo Ann Merica, The Lawyer’s Basic Guide to Domestic Violence, 62 
TEX. B.J. 915, 916 (1999) (stating that “[l]awyers have an ethical and moral 
obligation to inquire about the existence of domestic violence in criminal, 
family, and tort cases, among others.”). 
150 This general tendency has been noted elsewhere See Bruce J. Winick, 
Applying the Law Therapeutically in Domestic Violence Cases, 69 UMKC L. 
REV. 33, 69 (2000) (stating that “[m]any domestic violence clients will be in 
denial about their conduct or its wrongfulness, or will tend to rationalize or 
minimize it. Attorneys need to be aware of how to deal with these 
psychological defense mechanisms and how to engage in these highly sensitive 
conversations with the client.”). 
151 See also Marcia M. Maddox, Undoing the Unconscionable: Breaking 
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contract formation, such as whether a battered woman can ever 
be considered an “incompetent,” whether a true meeting of the 
minds has occurred, and whether there has been duress. Because 
of the extent to which Jane had extricated herself from the abuse, 
these were not issues in this case, although there were times 
earlier on in our working relationship when I considered them to 
be potential issues. 
As in a divorce agreement, I wanted to take steps to involve 
as little need for direct communication as possible and resolve 
many of the foreseeable problems and to minimize the potential 
for confrontation and conflict. I made the contract self-executing 
to the extent possible. I made the definitions section of the 
agreement as complete and clear as I could. I also tried to build 
in real easily identifiable consequences for Bill in the event that 
he defaulted on his obligations under the contract. For example, 
if he failed to move out of the apartment at the agreed upon time 
and the closing was delayed as a result; he was solely responsible 
for any associated costs, including legal fees. To some degree, all 
of these are things I would want to do in any contract, but in this 
case the stakes were much higher. 
 
Professor Jennifer Rosato 
I know we are running out of time, but I hope you’ll hang in. 
There’s still more to say. I try to do whatever I can, in whatever 
courses I have, to think about many of the social issues that are 
raised. Domestic violence is just one of them. And I’m not really 
looking in a course like family law to students like Kristin, who 
are very, very aware of these issues, who are knowledgeable 
already when they come to my class, but there are a lot of 
students in my family law class—I teach about 60 or 70 students 
each year—who either have experiences that are relevant, but 
they’re there mostly because it’s a bar course, not because they 
                                                          
Unlawful Separation “Agreements,” 2 ATLA-CLE 2097 (2001) (addressing 
marital agreements arising from domestic violence situations and highlighting 
that evidence of domestic violence indicates that the parties to the contract do 
not have equal bargaining power and such agreements may be deemed 
unconscionable). 
DVSYMPOSIUMXX.DOC 7/7/03  11:06 AM 
474 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
want to be enlightened. They want to hear, mostly, what are the 
equitable distribution rules, what are the rules for custody in New 
York. It seems almost a deviation for me to be doing domestic 
violence work in the class.152 
That brings me to a couple of concerns that I always have to 
think about when I’m doing an issue like domestic violence in my 
classroom. The first is what has been called the feminazi 
problem.153 That’s a problem especially if you are a woman 
professor and you’re raising these issues in your classroom. I 
think you have to be very careful that it’s not considered part of 
your agenda that you’re ramming down students’ throats. 
Therefore, it has to be done very sensitively; it can’t be done 
everyday. In some sense, you have to be more neutral than you 
might in other situations, because you can’t let your thoughts 
about domestic violence seep into the conversation. Because in 
my mind, the reason why you raise domestic violence issues is 
not just for the enlightenment and learning, but also for the 
openness of the discussion that occurs. If you shut it down with 
your own agenda, that important discussion will not take place. 
Therefore, before you start, you have to presume that in your 
class there are folks who have been victims, folks who have been 
perpetrators, folks that have worked for DA’s (District Attorney) 
offices, folks that have worked in the defense context as well. 
With that in mind, I try to teach domestic violence issues using 
role-plays. That’s very important to me, to get people out of 
                                                          
152 Cf. Naomi Cahn & Joan Meier, New Approaches to Poverty Law, 
Teaching and Practice: Domestic Violence and Feminist Jurisprudence: 
Towards a New Agenda, 4 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 339, 348 (1995) (noting that 
outside of the clinical context and feminist jurisprudence, few courses other 
than family law cover domestic violence and even within family law most 
casebooks devote relatively few pages to the subject). 
153 See Lani Guinier et al., Becoming Gentlemen: Women’s Experience at 
One Ivy League Law School, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 52, 82 (1994) (describing 
the law school experience of a woman who was called a man-hating “feminazi 
dyke” for her assertiveness); Donna E. Young, Working Across Borders: 
Global Restructuring and Women’s Work, 2001 UTAH L. REV. 1, 69 n.335 
(2001) (attributing the growing use of the term “feminazi” as an inappropriate 
representation of anti-male feminism, to television and radio personalities). 
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personalizing their answer with “I think this,” “I feel this.”154 
Specifically, what I do in family law is to create a fairly 
extensive role-play in which I give students roles as associates in 
a law firm who have a client coming to visit them during the next 
class. As for the role of the client, I do a little bit of casting 
myself, usually a former student that I know has a sensitivity to 
these issues, but also who is a very good actress. 
One year I found that the portrayal was almost too real. The 
actress who I had in the role of “Linda,” the victim, actually 
broke down and cried. The class didn’t really know what to do. 
There was a collective sense of cognitive dissonance for a 
moment—“Was this real or was this pretend?” Afterwards, she 
said to me, “I don’t know what came over me. I just got so into 
the role that I forgot about what I was supposed to be doing.” 
As a professor, you don’t want the role-play to be a bad 
Lifetime movie, right? On the one hand you want to role-play, 
you want to put people in a role, you want them to get interested 
and outside of themselves. On the other hand, you don’t want to 
make it so fake that it seems like we are just playing games. 
Until I teach them the black-letter law, that balance is sometimes 
                                                          
154 The merits of role-playing and other alternative teaching methods have 
been noted by other commentators, cf. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Case Studies 
in Legal Ethics: Telling Stories in School: Using Case Studies and Stories to 
Teach Legal Ethics, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 787 (2000). (providing a review of 
various approaches to case studies, narratives and role-playing as educational 
tools in the legal classroom). See also Janet Weinstein, Coming of Age: 
Recognizing the Importance of Interdisciplinary Education in Law Practice, 74 
WASH. L. REV. 319 (1999). Weinstein examines interdisciplinary education as 
a method to train lawyers to be “creative problem solvers” who can better 
serve the needs of their clients. Id. at 319 Her article reviews a model used at 
the San Diego Interdisciplinary Training Program in Child Abuse and Neglect 
and advocates exposing law students to professionals or students from other 
disciplines within a problem setting. Id. at 354-61. Weinstein posits: 
[i]f we understand the developmental levels at which many of our 
students enter school, we should make efforts to expose them to law 
practice as early in their education as possible. An increase in role-
playing and a requirement of pro bono work beginning in the first 
year of school would accelerate maturation from both sociocultural 
and psychological perspectives. 
Id. at 362. 
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hard to achieve. Sometimes I try to do it by bringing in someone 
from the outside so it’s not just me sitting in a chair with a wig. 
“Oh, that’s so funny, Professor Rosato. You’re playing the 
victim today.” I have done that from time to time, when I’ve 
needed to. But having that stranger in the room changes the tone 
of the room significantly. 
As the role-play begins, I ask the experts in the class—three 
designated students—to interview the client. Before class, I give 
the actress background facts to review. I ask her to be 
forthcoming with the facts, but not too forthcoming. I think it’s 
interesting that even when I use the same scenario, every class 
elicits a different set of facts. Because in this particular scenario 
there is abuse going back five years. It’s not very often that the 
class, in the limited amount of time they have, really sees that the 
pattern of abuse comes up often very early in the couple’s 
relationship. 
During the class, we not only get the facts during the 
interview, but also do some problem solving. We add in a little 
bit of skill development. The role-play is a realistic one, even 
though it is applied to a non-stereotypical situation: a young, 
white, middle-class couple. I developed the hypothetical with a 
clinical professor. By running the hypothetical past one of my 
clinical colleagues, I was able to really develop the ideas and 
make sure that they were going to work out in context. During 
the role-play, I have the students go back and forth with this 
actress, our victim/client. She talks about the issues that have 
come up in her relationship with her abusive husband. I have 
given the students the applicable laws beforehand so they can ask 
meaningful questions to reveal the material facts. 
The interview usually takes place on one class day. For the 
next class, we come back and I ask, “What should we do about 
Ms. Fairless, our client?” What I find most interesting is, first of 
all, the discussion—like the interview—is different every time I 
use this hypothetical. It’s amazing how that happens. Second, I 
find that there are some people who speak who have never 
spoken in class before and never will speak again. The subject 
engages them at some level. I try to have an open discussion, so 
it means that the students who are or have been police officers 
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tell me what it’s like for a woman to get an order of protection 
and explain the role of law enforcement. DA interns talk about 
the prosecutor’s role in the system. In the end, the discussion has 
a sensitizing effect if you do it right: the students become 
teachers by showing each other where they have been and there’s 
a non-judgmental aspect to it. However, I think it’s essential that 
if you are an opinionated professor and you don’t think you can 
stay neutral, don’t try this type of exercise in your class.155 
Because it is going to fail and it’s going to fail very badly and 
perhaps negatively affect the entire semester. 
Eventually, we do talk about the law. First, we discuss the 
meaning of stalking in context.156 We have the statute in front of 
us,157 and we have an interesting debate about whether a husband 
                                                          
155 See generally Menkel-Meadow, Telling Stories in School, supra note 
154, at 814-16 (describing the practical mechanics of teaching with case 
studies and role-playing and noting that the professor’s task is to place students 
in roles and facilitate dialogue); Weinstein, Coming of Age: Recognizing the 
Importance of Interdisciplinary Education in Law Practice, supra note 154, at 
361 (noting that professors “are in the position to model questioning behavior” 
and that, ideally, a professor’s questions “would truly be information 
seeking”). 
156 See also Susan E. Bernstein, Living Under Siege: Do Stalking Laws 
Protect Domestic Violence Victims?, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 525, 529-30 (1993) 
(analyzing case histories representing the typical stalking situation—the jealous 
lover, the violent husband or the vengeful ex-husband). 
157 A number of states have passed stalking legislation that could be used 
as teaching tools; although specifics invariably differ, Utah’s legislation is 
illustrative. UTAH CODE ANN. §76-5-106.5 (2002). It provides that: 
A person is guilty of stalking who: 
(a) intentionally or knowingly engages in a course of conduct directed 
at a specific person that would cause a reasonable person: 
(i) to fear bodily injury to himself or a member of his immediate 
family; or 
(ii) to suffer emotional distress to himself or a member of his 
immediate family; 
(b) has knowledge or should have knowledge that the specific person: 
(i) will be placed in reasonable fear of bodily injury to himself or a 
member of his immediate family; or 
(ii) will suffer emotional distress or a member of his immediate 
family will suffer emotional distress; and 
(c) whose conduct: 
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following his wife around in a grocery store everyday for a week 
constitutes stalking. We deal with the legal aspects but also what 
is the reality, and how the application of the law works in a 
particular context.158 We also address more broadly whether the 
use of legal remedies is even appropriate, and whether the use of 
legal remedies can escalate violence.159 I’m sure that, in the real 
world you say, “Okay, well, the best thing to do is to get that 
protective order.”160 But how is this really going to play out in 
this relationship? And we have a tendency as lawyers to get right 
to the legal remedy, but it may be an entirely inappropriate thing 
to do,161 and we talk about that dilemma. We don’t necessarily 
                                                          
(i) induces fear in the specific person of bodily injury to himself or a 
member of his immediate family; or 
(ii) causes emotional distress in the specific person or a member of 
his immediate family. 
Id. 
158 See, e.g., H.E.S. v. J.C.S., 815 A.2d 405 (N.J. Super. 2003) (holding 
that husband’s alleged video surveillance of wife’s bedroom could constitute 
harassment and stalking as predicate offenses of domestic violence); Milillo v. 
Milillo, 748 N.Y.S.2d 850 (Fam. Ct. 2002) (mother’s allegations of three 
physical break-ins by father to her home, in which she lived alone with her 
children, made out cognizable claim of stalking); People v. Kieronski, 542 
N.W.2d 339 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that there was sufficient evidence 
to bind defendant on charge of aggravated stalking of his ex-wife; ex-wife 
testified that defendant approached her at public places and stated “I’ll get 
you, bitch!”). 
159 See generally Catharine F. Klein & Leslye E. Orloff, Providing Legal 
Protection for Battered Women: An Analysis of State Statutes and Case Law, 
21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 801 (1993) (noting different studies that indicate the 
failure of restraining orders to adequately protect women from further abuse). 
The article also surveys civil protection order statutes and state appellate 
opinions and examines recent developments, trends and innovations. Id. at 
813. 
160 The protective order is the primary method to deal with domestic 
violence in the United States. See Margaret Martin Barry, Protective Order 
Enforcement: Another Pirouette, 6 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 339, 348 (1995) 
[hereinafter Barry, Protective Order Enforcement] (discussing the role of 
protective orders in responding to domestic violence issues). 
161 It has been noted that many attorneys do not understand domestic 
violence and its effect on the survivors. See Edward S. Snyder, Remedies for 
Domestic Violence: A Continuing Challenge, 12 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. 
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reach a solution, but we talk about it. 
We also consider the lawyer’s role as counselor, as Kristin 
just raised so beautifully so I don’t really need to say more about 
it.162 But what we raise, for example, is what kind of counseling 
a lawyer should do.163 As a teacher, I take a fairly passive role in 
this discussion. I don’t say “in my experience.” Instead, I ask, 
“What is our role here?” since many students want to send our 
client to a mental health professional because they think she is 
being too weak. Some say: “What’s wrong with her? Why can’t 
she stand up to her husband?” Others are saying, “That’s not our 
role. Our role is not to be counselors.” Therefore, there’s a back 
and forth about what the appropriate role of a lawyer is.164 
Often, we also have a child in the picture. So it’s also 
important for the class to think about the legal ramifications not 
                                                          
LAW. 335, 338 (1994). (observing that rather than attempting to understand 
the psychological impact on survivors, attorneys generally seek legal 
remedies.) The survivor’s lack of resolve in prosecuting the batterer with 
criminal charges of abuse leads most attorneys to seek civil protective orders. 
See Barry, Protective Order Enforcement, supra note 160, at 345. Although 
civil protective orders may be a popular remedy, they are not sufficiently 
enforced to make them as effective as possible. Id. at 348. Protective orders 
also do little in the way of reforming or punishing batterers because they only 
remove the batterer from his victim. Id. at 346. 
162 See presentation of Kristin Bebelaar, supra pp. 460-73. See also 
Robert L. Valente, Addressing Domestic Violence: The Role of the Family Law 
Practitioner, 29 FAM. L.Q. 187, 191-3 (1995) (noting that, to be an effective 
counselor, attorneys representing battered clients should first acknowledge 
domestic violence as both a psychological and legal problem and rather than 
exclusively addressing the legal aspects of a situation). 
163 See generally id. at 194 (articulating the legal counseling a lawyer 
should provide and noting that “family lawyers handling domestic violence 
cases must ensure that their clients receive appropriate treatment for their 
emotional and psychological issues by psychotherapists or counselors properly 
trained to handle domestic violence cases.”). 
164 The issue of a lawyer’s role in domestic violence cases and counseling 
has been explored extensively elsewhere. See, e.g., Phyllis E. Bernard, On 
Integrating Responses To Domestic Violence: Teaching Ethical, Holistic Client 
Representation in Family ADR, 47 LOY. L. REV. 163 (2001) (commenting that 
a family law attorney addressing divorce or custody has the dual role of 
identifying whether domestic violence is a factor and an ethical obligation to 
protect the client from receiving or inflicting additional harm). 
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only for the partners involved, but also for third parties.165 That 
also shapes what we do. 
I also try to bring in some of the non-legal aspects of it. We 
talk about whether Linda should stay with her mother, who’s a 
controlling person and tells Linda, “You stay with the man. He’s 
a good man. He brings home the bacon. He takes care of the 
child.” So her mom is telling Linda to stay, and that’s not maybe 
what she wants to do. But what’s the alternative? What’s a 
battered women’s shelter like? 
Some students in the class with experience in domestic 
violence matters educate the others and I think it’s very important 
to have that dialogue and look at the legal and non-legal 
aspects.166 The students not only think about what’s going to keep 
her safe, first and foremost, but also what is going to keep her 
the happiest in the long run and to pursue legal remedies if and 
when she needs them. 
None of the things I posed as part of the hypothetical, and 
this also goes to what you were saying about real life dilemmas. 
What if the client says, “Thank you very much but I don’t think 
                                                          
165 Addressing domestic violence in homes where children are present 
requires consideration of additional legal and parental matters. See, e.g., In re 
Deandre T., 676 N.Y.S.2d 666 (App. Div. 1998) (holding that domestic 
violence by a child’s father against the mother witnessed by the child was 
sufficient to constitute neglect because it placed the child in imminent danger 
of mental impairment); In re Bryan L., 565 N.Y.S.2d 969 (Fam. Ct. 1991) 
(concerning an allegation that a man beat his wife in the presence of their child 
and that this behavior exposed the child to the risk of emotional and mental 
impairment); E.R. v. G.S.R., 648 N.Y.S.2d 257 (Fam. Ct. 1996) (mandating 
the consideration of the impact of domestic violence on the child in a custody 
and visitation proceeding). See also Amy Haddix, Unseen Victims: 
Acknowledging the Effects of Domestic Violence on Children Through 
Statutory Termination of Parental Rights, 84 CAL. L. REV. 757, 769 (1996) 
(noting that trial courts have terminated a father’s parental rights for 
committing acts of domestic violence against the mother in the child’s 
presence). 
166 Other commentators have explored this dichotomy. See generally 
Joyce Klemperer, Programs for Battered Women—What Works?, 58 ALB. L. 
REV. 1171, 1178-82 (1995) (stating that one non-legal aspect of domestic 
violence is what to do with victims who are seeking to get away from their 
abuser). 
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I’m going to need your services anymore.” What do you do as a 
lawyer? In that scenario, is my duty as a lawyer to follow up or 
to simply hope that nothing happens to her?167 
I think all of these legal, non-legal, and emotional issues are 
very important issues to raise in law school. I admit that 
sometimes I do it on the cheap, and I apologize if I do, but I 
think any well-intentioned attempts are worth it.168 That’s what 
I’ve always thought. 
 
Patricia Fersch 
I might be able to help with some real life examples. I have a 
low-fee law office and I represent both men and women. I jotted 
down some names of some actual cases that I’ve worked on with 
varying results that I thought would be helpful. I will use their 
real first names because it just makes it easier for me to 
somewhat tell their stories. 
I will say that my concerns as a practitioner are always, and I 
think I have them in the right order: safety first, hers and the 
children’s safety; secondly, support. Again, in the right order—
emotional and financial. Strangely, the last concern is the legal 
                                                          
167 As a general rule, the lawyer’s duty to his or her client is a product of 
an established lawyer-client relationship and no duty extends to individuals 
who decline legal representation. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 
(Scope [3]) (2002) (“Most of the duties flowing from the client-lawyer 
relationship attach only after the client has requested the lawyer to render legal 
services and the lawyer has agreed to do so.”). But see generally Christine A. 
Picker, The Intersection of Domestic Violence and Child Abuse: Ethical 
Considerations and Tort Issues for Attorneys Who Represent Battered Women 
with Abused Children, 12 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 69 (1993) (exploring 
the potential expansion of a lawyer’s duties in the context of domestic 
violence). 
168 See, e.g., Marjorie A. Silver, Love, Hate, and Other Emotional 
Interference in the Lawyer/Client Relationship, 6 CLINICAL L. REV. 259 
(1999) (articulating reasons for and ways to cultivate law students’ emotional 
intelligence in order to better represent clients in emotionally charged cases); 
Shalleck, supra note 57, at 1022 (asserting that law schools should take an 
active role in counteracting pervasive stereotyping of battered women to 
transform the legal community’s understanding and representation of such 
clients). 
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issues.169 But let me get to some of the stories. 
First of all, to answer the last question that the professor 
posed, “What if the client stops your services?”170 That is a real 
problem, but there’s really not a thing, frankly, that I can do 
about it. So I’ll start with the case of Lillian. 
Lillian is very well educated and married to an attorney who 
at one time worked for the District Attorney’s office in the 
Domestic Violence Unit in one of the five boroughs. By the time 
Lillian came to my office she already had a criminal order of 
protection, evidence of very apparent physical abuse and a child 
that was about a month or two months old at the time. The issue 
for her initially was her apartment. She was in the apartment. He 
was out—he had been ordered out by the criminal court. But she 
was in his apartment and of course the child was his child. Lillian 
was unsure about what to do; whether she should go to Albany—
her family was from the Albany area—whether she should stay in 
the county she was in and whether he would fight her in terms of 
issues of relocation because he was, of course, a lawyer. I won’t 
get into the relocation issues, but you can certainly address that 
with your family law professors. 
As a result, Lillian was very unsteady. My role initially was 
to encourage her to make or take some steps, such as seek 
counseling. Finances weren’t a problem for her because she had 
a certain amount of cash that she had accumulated prior to the 
marriage. But it was going to be a problem because he was no 
longer in the District Attorney’s office. Her husband was now a 
private practitioner who took all his fees in cash and had not filed 
taxes for about ten years, which was a wedge to use against him 
if I got him into court. But the key was to get him into court. 
Lillian, however, did not want to go into court.171 I started the 
                                                          
169 This prioritization has been advocated elsewhere. See, e.g., V. Pualani 
Enos & Lois H. Kanter, Who’s Listening? Introducing Students to Client-
Centered, Client-Empowering, and Multidisciplinary Problem-Solving in a 
Clinical Setting, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 83, 93-94 (2002) (defining the client-
oriented approach as one that seeks to give primacy to the overall well-being 
of the client while de-emphasizing the legal concerns). 
170 See presentation of Professor Jennifer Rosato, supra pp. 473-81. 
171 In fact, many domestic violence victims are hesitant to pursue legal 
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action and she dropped the ball. The case was before one of the 
most respected judges of the New York County Supreme Court, 
and I made the court aware of my problem with the client. I 
adjourned the case a couple of times, but unfortunately, Lillian 
dropped the action and never appeared. 
She returned to my office a year later after sending me a 
Christmas card with the baby’s picture. Lillian wanted to re-start 
the action. We started it again, and again she stopped it, saying 
that they were going to work things out. To my knowledge, in 
the last year, thankfully, she was not physically battered again. 
But that’s one example. 
Another case was that of Robin. She was a vice president for 
one of the banks, an absolutely beautiful, stunning, intelligent 
African-American woman, married to an African-American man. 
They had two boys, eight and ten years old. The husband was, I 
don’t mean to be crude, but he was really a low-life. 
Here there was no physical evidence of the abuse, whereas in 
the first case I had physical evidence, and that client had an order 
of protection.172 In this case there was no physical evidence of 
abuse, no police record, and no order of protection. Robin had 
never called the police or sought an order of protection. The 
violence had escalated, but I had no evidence. However, I 
absolutely, unequivocally and without a doubt believed my client. 
There wasn’t a question in my mind. The problem here was her 
safety and the safety of the two kids, with the abusive husband in 
the house and no record to get him out. 
The judge in this case, while refusing to order the husband 
                                                          
action against their abusers for various reasons. See, e.g., Meier, supra note 
29, at 1345 (listing various reasons why victims are hesitant to turn to the 
courts for help such as the fear of retaliation, fear of facing their abusers in 
the courtroom, or believing that the presence of danger is insufficient to 
warrant legal action). 
172 The trend in domestic violence physical assault cases is for the 
suppression of evidence of the abuse. See PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY 
THOENNES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FULL REPORT OF THE PREVALENCE, 
INCIDENCE AND CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 51 (2000). 
According to definitive government statistics on violence against women, only 
41.5 percent of female victims of physical assault by intimates showed 
physical injury. Id. 
DVSYMPOSIUMXX.DOC 7/7/03  11:06 AM 
484 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
out, held a tight rein on the situation. The judge was concerned 
that getting him out would put Robin in worse harm. So the judge 
kept him appearing in court literally every single day until there 
was a resolution—and some of you may not like the solution. I 
can’t say that I was really happy about it either but she was safe, 
the kids were safe and, ultimately, we got the husband out. This 
case is about three years old and I spoke to Robin recently. She 
thanked me and so I guess all’s well that ends well. The bottom 
line was that the judge helped me realize that if we give this guy 
some money we’d get rid of him. This was exactly what we did—
we gave him some money and he went away. He’s been away for 
three years. He chooses not to see his kids. He doesn’t bother her 
and she’s happy as can be. 
I admit that it was not the legal solution that I originally set 
out to get, which was, so I can be clear, a divorce, an order of 
protection ordering him out and for my client to get to keep all 
the money because he was a bum and made no contribution to the 
marriage or the kids. It was certainly a solution that has worked 
for Robin and those kids in terms of their safety. Furthermore, 
the amount of money in the scheme of things—which was about 
fifteen or twenty-five thousand dollars—was a rather minimal 
amount of money in this situation. However, relative to the other 
families I usually work with, offering such a sum would be 
impossible for most to bear. But in this case it was possible, and 
it worked. 
It appears that I am out of time. So, I guess the one thing I 
wanted to say, and I’ll end with this, is that the most difficult 
thing that I’ve found is many of the people who really are in 
trouble in terms of domestic violence don’t say it.173 Many 
victims remain silent. However, I often find people coming into 
                                                          
173 There are numerous reasons why battered women would remain silent 
about their abuse. See, e.g., Barbara J. Hart, Victim Issues, Minnesota Center 
Against Violence and Abuse, at http://www.mincava.umn.edu/hart/victimi. 
htm. (last visited Feb. 27, 2003). They may fear retaliation and heightened 
abuse from their abusers; fear that they will be blamed for the violence 
perpetrated against them; believe that reporting the abuse would be futile; be 
without resources to engage in a prolonged legal battle; or may believe that 
they can best protect themselves and their children by remaining silent. Id. 
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my office saying, “I’m a victim of domestic violence.” Those 
people are usually the ones whose marriage is unraveling.174 It 
may not be pretty. What’s going on in their household may not 
be anything that anyone wants to live through. But it’s a marriage 
or a relationship unraveling, which is very, very different from 
domestic violence.175 
The other question is that—I don’t know if anybody talked 
about it, and I’m obviously not going to get time to—when 
domestic violence is used as a weapon especially with regard to 
custody and visitation issues.176 But I guess we’ll save that for 
another day. Thanks for your time. 
 
Professor Elizabeth Schneider 
Thanks to all of our panelists for these great presentations. 
There are people in the audience who have done work in the area 
or are teaching about domestic violence in other law schools that 
I’d like to recognize. 
                                                          
174 See, e.g., William G. Austin, Partner Violence and Risk Assessment in 
Child Custody Evaluations, 39 FAM. CT. REV. 483, 491 (2001) (asserting that 
“clinical [studies] are likely to contain a higher level of psychological 
disturbance and more entrenched family conflict (e.g., couples involved in 
marital therapy), where biased reporting might be expected”); Andre Derdeyn 
& Elizabeth Scott, Rethinking Joint Custody, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 455, 493 
(1984) (stating that “spouses in a deteriorating relationship may become 
intensely competitive in an effort to protect themselves from distress caused by 
the partner and to blame the spouse for the failing relationship”). 
175 Cf. William G. Austin, Assessing Credibility in Allegations of Marital 
Violence in the High-Conflict Child Custody Case, 38 FAM. & CONCILIATION 
CTS. REV. 462, 466 (2000) (discussing “issues of reliability and validity in the 
measurement of [alleged marital violence] in the child custody evaluation,” 
and proposing a six-part test to evaluate the plausibility of domestic violence 
allegations). 
176 See id. at 491 (stating that “[a]lthough violence reporting may be more 
reliable than previously thought, this does not imply that there will not be self-
interested distortions of violence reports for the complex child custody case 
involving domestic violence. When the case cannot be mediated or settled and 
a [child custody evaluation] is ordered, it is expected that there will be a 
highly contentious quality to the case, in which information manipulation will 
be common.”). 
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We have Vicki Lutz from the Pace Law School Battered 
Women’s Justice Center, a law school program devoted to 
student representation of battered women, and Vanessa Merton 
also from Pace Law School, who teaches in the area of health 
law as well as other issues that touch on domestic violence. We 
have Kim Susser, Director of the Domestic Violence Initiative at 
the New York Legal Assistance Group (NYLAG), who co-
teaches a course on domestic violence and the law at St. John’s 
University Law School. Nancy Erickson, who was already 
mentioned, has done pioneering work and legal scholarship in 
this area, first as a law professor at Ohio State and now in private 
practice here in New York. Minna Kotkin established a Violence 
Against Women Act Project several years ago in the Federal 
Litigation Clinic that she directs here at Brooklyn Law School. 
This was a very innovative and important project—counseling, 
doing outreach, and educating women about their rights under the 
civil rights remedy of the Violence Against Women Act, until it 
was held unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court in 
United States v. Morrison.177 Finally a person is with us today 
who will be coming into the fold, Deborah Tuerkheimer, now 
with the Brooklyn DA’s office. Deborah will be joining the 
faculty at the University of Maine Law School in Fall 2002 and 
teaching a course there on domestic violence. I would like to 
acknowledge one other person in the audience, Hedda Nussbaum. 
In addition to the criminal case here in New York that I’m sure 
many of you are aware of involving Hedda, she was the plaintiff 
in Nussbaum v. Steinberg that Betty litigated successfully in 
Manhattan Supreme Court and the Appellate Division, First 
Department.178 Kristin and I wrote an amicus curiae brief in that 
                                                          
177 529 U.S. 598 (2000). The Supreme Court found that the Commerce 
Clause did not grant Congressional authority to regulate “noneconomic, 
violent criminal conduct based solely on that conduct’s aggregate effect on 
interstate commerce” and that VAWA was also unconstitutional under Section 
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 617. 
178 618 N.Y.S.2d 168 (Sup. Ct. 1994), aff’d, 703 N.Y.S.2d 32 (App. 
Div. 2000). Hedda Nussbaum, battered companion of Joel Steinberg, who was 
convicted of killing their illegally adopted 6-year-old daughter, proved that 
years of his abuse rendered her so incapacitated that the statute of limitations 
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case and helped to organize law professors around the country on 
these issues. Now let’s hear questions, comments and reactions 
from members of the audience. 
 
Nancy Erickson 
Are there any movements in the statute of limitations area? 
Anything happening there? 
 
Betty Levinson 
There are, but they’re limited. Let me start with New York, 
which I know best. Both the toll for infancy and insanity are in 
the same section of the CPLR.179 In either event, the toll of the 
statute of limitations extends for ten years past the date of the tort 
for which there would ordinarily be a one-year statute. 180 
                                                          
on her claims against him for assault and other intentional torts was tolled. 
Ms. Nussbaum argued that the statute of limitations on her claims should be 
stopped from expiring by section 208 of New York’s Civil Practice Law and 
Rules, which extends the time to sue for persons under a disability due to 
infancy or insanity. A referee agreed that Ms. Nussbaum had proven “an 
overall inability to function in society,” the standard applied by the New York 
Court of Appeals to the term insanity in the statute, and thus her civil suit 
against Mr. Steinberg could go to trial. The Appellate Division, First 
Department, affirmed the decision. See also Cerisse Anderson, Tolling of 
Time-Bar Allows Nussbaum to Sue Steinberg, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 11, 1997, at 1. 
179 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 201 (McKinney 2003). “An action, including 
one brought in the name or for the benefit of the state, must be commenced 
within the time specified in this article unless a different time is prescribed by 
law or a shorter time is prescribed by written agreement. No court shall 
extend the time limited by law for the commencement of an action.” Id. See 
also N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 203 (McKinney 2003). “The time within which an 
action must be commenced, except as otherwise expressly prescribed, shall be 
computed from the time the cause of action accrued to the time the claim is 
interposed.” Id. 
180 Nussbaum, 703 N.Y.S.2d at 33. The appellate division held: 
[t]he evidence adduced at the hearing and credited by the Special 
Referee amply demonstrated that, during the 10-year period 
preceding the commencement of this action, plaintiff was unable to 
protect her legal rights because of an overall inability to function in 
society, which tolled the one-year Statute of Limitations for 
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The toll for insanity does not require proof of insanity as 
understood in its colloquial use. As indicated in the leading case, 
McCarthy v. Volkswagen, you need to show that the person 
affected has been rendered incapable of functioning in society.181 
In Hedda Nussbaum’s case,182 the special referee who tried the 
summary judgment hearing on the toll explicitly held that an 
inability to function can arise for economic reasons. This 
suggests an expansion of the scope of “nonfunctioning” upon 
which the toll can be based. Thus, if an abuser impedes his 
victim’s access to their income and assets, and she is financially 
dependent upon him, and has no funds with which to separate 
herself and live her own life, let alone the freedom and funds to 
retain counsel for the purpose of suing him, such can contribute 
to the “nonfunctioning” justifying a toll. Expanding this 
definition of “functioning” is definitely helpful. 
Theories that have worked in other states either haven’t been 
tried or haven’t succeeded in New York. In New Jersey, there is 
good law based on continuing tort theory.183 In Idaho, a 
                                                          
intentional torts pursuant to CPLR § 208. 
Id. 
181 McCarthy v. Volkswagen, 450 N.Y.S.2d 457 (App. Div. 1982) 
(interpreting the toll for insanity to apply to “those individuals who are unable 
to protect their legal rights because of an over-all inability to function in 
society”). 
182 Nussbaum, 703 N.Y.S.2d at 33. The appellate division held that “[t]he 
evidence adduced at the hearing and credited by the Special Referee amply 
demonstrated that, during the 10-year period preceding the commencement of 
this action, plaintiff was unable to protect her legal rights because of an 
overall inability to function in society, which tolled the one-year Statute of 
Limitations for intentional torts pursuant to CPLR § 208.” Id. 
183 See Giovine v. Giovine, 284 N.J. Super. 3, 18 (App. Div. 1995) 
(holding that a plaintiff “shall be entitled to present proof that she has the 
medically diagnosed condition of battered woman’s syndrome” and is “entitled 
to sue her husband for damages attributable to his continuous tortuous conduct 
resulting in her present psychological condition, provided [that] medical, 
psychiatric, or psychological expert proof to establish[es] that she was caused 
to have an inability to take any action at all to improve or alter the situation”); 
Cusseaux v. Pickett, 279 N.J. Super. 335, 345 (App. Div. 1994) (“Because 
the battered-woman’s syndrome is the result of a continuing pattern of abuse 
and violent behavior that causes continuing damage, it must be treated in the 
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defendant was estopped from asserting a defense of the statute of 
limitations when his conduct was shown to be the reason the 
plaintiff refrained from suing him.184 Estoppel was rejected in 
New York in Hoffman v. Hoffman,185 where a young plaintiff 
sued her father and grandfather for childhood sexual abuse. As 
Judge Ciparick, who now sits on the New York Court of 
Appeals, functionally said in the Hoffman case, “Legislature, do 
something.” 
 
Professor Elizabeth Schneider 
I would like to underscore something that Tony said.186 There 
is some very good scholarship now, Nancy, on torts and 
domestic violence. First the Clare Dalton and Jenny Wriggins 
articles that Tony mentioned.187 We have an entire chapter on 
                                                          
same way as a continuing tort”). See also David E. Poplar, Tolling the Statute 
of Limitations for Battered Women After Giovine v. Giovine: Creating 
Equitable Exceptions for Victims of Domestic Abuse, 101 DICK. L. REV. 161, 
186 (1996) (defining a continuous tort as “one inflicted over a period of time; 
it involves wrongful conduct that is repeated until desisted . . . . A continuing 
tort sufficient to toll the statute of limitations is occasioned by continual 
unlawful acts, not by continual ill effects from an original violation,” and 
discussing this doctrine in the context of battered woman’s syndrome). 
184 Figueroa v. Merrick, 919 P.2d 1041, 1045 (Idaho Ct. App. 1996) 
(holding that the defendant was equitably estopped from asserting the statute of 
limitations defense because his “statements or conduct induced the plaintiff to 
refrain from prosecuting [the] action during the statutory limitation period.”). 
185 Hoffman v. Hoffman, 556 N.Y.S.2d 608, 609 (App. Div. 1990). The 
court held: 
since the plaintiff reached her majority in 1961 and since she is now 
over 40 years of age, the alleged conduct of the defendants is not 
actionable unless the defendants are estopped from raising the Statute 
of Limitations as a defense. As a matter of law, plaintiff has failed to 
allege sufficient facts, as was her burden, to establish that the action 
was brought within a reasonable time after the facts giving rise to the 
estoppel had ceased to be operational. 
Id. 
186 See presentation of Professor J. Anthony Sebok, supra pp. 444-48. 
187 Dalton, supra note 62, at 324 (exploring the ways in which abuse-
related injuries fit or do not fit into traditional tort categories, discussing how 
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torts in our casebook, which is in itself pretty amazing.188 You 
couldn’t have had anything like that ten years ago. 
So I think there’s a lot written. There are obviously the real 
life problems that Tony and Betty were talking about, but there 
are many interesting developments particularly on statute of 
limitations efforts around the country. 
 
Audience Member 
Speaking about legislative changes, I know there are multiple 
problems with women in non-traditional relationships. These 
changes would make terms in the law more gender neutral and 
broaden the definition of family relationships. I wonder if that 
has really translated into access to legal remedies for non-
traditional victims of domestic violence—men, people in same-
sex relationships, unmarried partners in family court arenas. I 
wonder if anybody could speak to that. 
 
Kristin Bebelaar 
There’s a lot of movement in Albany on a bill to expand the 
definition of family to include people who live together and are 
not married among the current definition. This would expand 
access to family court to those who are now unable to have that 
access.189 
                                                          
issues of process make it difficult for victims of domestic violence to pursue 
traditional claims, suggesting some substantive and procedural “fixes” for 
these difficulties, and addressing the ways in which it is likely that a tort claim 
by a victim of domestic abuse will be both triggered by, and complicated by, a 
concurrent, or recently concluded, divorce proceeding); Wriggins, supra note 
63, at 125 (asserting that as a consequence of the dearth of lawsuits in 
domestic violence cases, key aims of the tort system such as deterrence and 
loss-spreading are not achieved, and suggesting a more effective approach to 
civil liability for domestic violence torts through insurance reforms such as the 
Domestic Violence Torts Insurance Plan, which challenges the conventional 
wisdom that intentional torts cannot or should not be insurable). 
188 DALTON & SCHNEIDER, supra note 4, at 806-67. 
189 In the 2002-03 term, the State Assembly passed A2235, a bill that 
expanded the definition of family in the Family Court Act and Criminal 
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Patricia Fersch 
The reality right now is that family court is not a vehicle for 
same-sex couples who experience domestic violence, unless they 
have another issue—unless they have a child in common. 
 
Betty Levinson 
There are ways around that, depending upon what remedy 
you’re seeking, as long as you have a cause of action that could 
go to supreme court. You can always ask for preliminary 
injunctive relief, which can include an order of protection. In 
fact, there are cases which I have used and recommended stating 
that even if you can’t go to family court you can attach a TRO to 
any claim. 
 
Audience Member 
Have any of you have seen any action around the gender 
animus legislation in New York City and Westchester that allows 
a tort action based on domestic violence over a six to seven year 
period?190 Of course the problem is that you’ve got to show 
                                                          
Procedure Law to include “members of the same family or household.” This 
would include “unrelated persons who continually or at regular intervals reside 
in the same household or have done so in the past.” See State Assemb. A2235, 
2003-2004 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2003), available at http://assembly.state.ny.us/ 
leg/?bn=02235 (last visited Apr. 3, 2003). 
190 NEW YORK CITY, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE tit. 8, §§ 8-901-907 (2000), 
the “Victims of Gender Motivated Violence Protection Act.” The statutory 
language closely follows that of the federal Violence Against Women Act and 
allows victims of gender-motivated violent acts to sue their attackers. See also 
Julie Goldscheid & Risa Kaufman, Seeking Redress for Gender-Based Bias 
Crimes—Charting New Ground in Familiar Legal Territory, 6 MICH. J. RACE 
& L. 265, 271 (2001) (examining state laws provide redress for gender-
motivated violence). Recently, a plaintiff whose case against her former fiancé 
for alleged gender-motivated abuse, brought under the federal Violence 
Against Women Act, was dismissed because the applicable part of the Act was 
struck down by the Supreme Court while her case was pending but was 
allowed to be heard upon refilling in state court under New York City’s local 
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gender animus, but has anybody seen such activity? 
 
Professor Elizabeth Schneider 
I don’t know the answer to that. I’ve been wondering about 
that, myself. After Morrison held the civil rights remedy of the 
Violence Against Woman Act unconstitutional, New York City 
passed legislation to create a local remedy.191 
Now, the problem is that many cases involving the gender 
animus requirement under the civil rights remedy of VAWA 
never got to the merits because of the constitutionality problem. 
My view always was that once they got past the constitutionality 
hurdle, there were going to be big problems with the gender 
animus requirement. My hunch was that rape looks like gender 
animus to people, but domestic violence does not. That raises 
questions that go to what Stacy Caplow discussed about unlinking 
the issues. 
That is ironic to me because the whole thrust of my argument 
in Battered Women and Feminist Lawmaking is to put domestic 
violence back into a much more affirmative gender equality 
framework.192 In one of the chapters in that book, written before 
                                                          
law. Local Law Applied Retroactively, 8 CITY L. 64 (2002). The court applied 
the new law retroactively because the law’s intent was to supply a private 
remedy to the victims of domestic violence and fill a void left by the Supreme 
Court’s opinion. Id. 
191 NEW YORK CITY, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE tit. 8 §§8-901-907 (2000). The 
statute went into effect December 19, 2000, and was enacted because “in light 
of the void left by the Supreme Court’s decision, the Council [found] that 
victims of gender-motivated violence should have a private right of action 
against their perpetrators under the Administrative Code.” Id. In its 
Declaration of Legislative Findings and Intent, the City Council further 
described the gravity of the problems faced by victims of gender-motivated 
violence within the court system and sought “to resolve the difficulty that 
victims face in seeking court remedies by providing an officially sanctioned 
and legitimate cause of action for seeking redress for injuries resulting from 
gender-motivated violence.” Id. 
192 SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN, supra note 69, at 5-7. 
Feminist legal arguments about gender violence have developed from 
feminist insights about the way heterosexual intimate violence is part 
of a larger system of coercive control and subordination; this system 
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Morrison was decided, I discuss why I think courts are not going 
to be very responsive around the gender animus arguments.193 
Frankly, I think those points are still true, even under the New 
York City formulation of it, even though it’s a different 
formulation. 
The point is—that judges still have to interpret the meaning. 
If a batterer beats a woman and says, “I hate women as a class,” 
then judges more are likely to see gender animus. If he’s just 
beating her, judges will ask, why does that show gender animus? 
That’s a particular problem of consciousness and sensitivity—an 
enormous hurdle. That means that lawyers have to explain the 
systemic, individual and social dimensions of battering, which is 
very much the framework of our casebook. This is a tremendous 
educational challenge for judges, for lawyers, for law students, 
for law professors—for all of us—to put these pieces together and 
understand battering within this larger social context. 
Thank you all for a very stimulating and informative 
program. 
 
                                                          
is based on structural gender inequality and has political roots. The 
source of insight about the connection between lived personal 
experience and structural power relations was the notion that “the 
personal is political.”. . . In the process of lawmaking, feminist ideas 
about the relationship between violence and gender have been 
simultaneously transformed, depoliticized, subverted, and contained: 
the broader link between violence and gender inequality that animated 
them, has, to a large degree, been lost, or at least undermined. 
Id. 
193 Id. at 188-96. (suggesting that the same social attitudes that have 
emerged and shaped the law in other domestic violence contexts—private, 
personal or family issues—are likely to prevent intimate violence from being 
understood or interpreted by judges as an issue of gender). 
